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When Hawaii seemed poised to be the first state of the Union to permit same-sex marriage in the 1990s, Congress passed
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).1 The Act had
1. The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that denying marriage licenses to gays violated the Hawaii Constitution. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 59–67 (Haw. 1993). Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996,
but in 1998, voters in Hawaii adopted a constitutional amendment that effec-
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two parts. One provided a definition of marriage for purposes of
federal law that excluded same-sex unions.2 The second part
was a choice-of-law provision that provided that states were not
required to recognize same-sex marriages performed in sister
states or judgments in connection with such marriages.3
Though many scholars have argued that DOMA exceeded Congress’s powers,4 controversies concerning DOMA’s provisions
have not yet appeared in the courts because Hawaii did not ultimately legalize same-sex marriage.
Claims of DOMA’s unconstitutionality recently have intensified following the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, which struck down as unconstitutional state laws that
criminalized sodomy.5 Moreover, now that Massachusetts has
become the first jurisdiction within the United States to solemnize same-sex marriages,6 the scenarios DOMA sought to address certainly will arise. Accordingly, this is an opportune
time to revisit the question of DOMA’s constitutionality.
This Article’s thesis is that DOMA is not unconstitutional—at least not yet. There are two components to the
analysis. The first is a demonstration that Lawrence has not
invalidated DOMA. The second component is an explanation as
to why DOMA was not otherwise beyond Congress’s powers
even before Lawrence.

tively overturned the Hawaii Supreme Court’s opinion. See Note, Litigating
the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2684–85 (2004).
2. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat.
2419 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
3. See id. § 2(a) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
4. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of
Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14 (1997); Larry Kramer,
Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 2000–07 (1997).
5. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
6. Gay marriage became legal in Massachusetts on May 17, 2004, in response to the decision by Massachusetts’s highest court that the Massachusetts Constitution demanded that marriage be available to gays. See Opinions
of the Justices to the Senate, 809 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (concluding
that the state constitution requires that gays be permitted to marry, not simply have access to civil unions); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 968 (Mass. 2003). See generally Associated Press, Gay Couples Exchange
Vows in Massachusetts, MSNBC NEWS, May 18, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn
.com/id/4991967 (summarizing the events surrounding and reaction to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision to let same-sex couples
marry).
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Part I of the Article argues that Lawrence has not invalidated DOMA. Though Justice Scalia in dissent argued that
Lawrence’s logic invariably leads to the conclusion that the
Constitution prohibits government from treating gay marriage
differently from heterosexual marriage—a proposition that, if
true, would render DOMA unconstitutional—the Lawrence
opinion expressly reserved the question of what the Constitution has to say about same-sex marriage. The Lawrence opinion
certainly contains analysis that advocates of same-sex marriage can muster on their behalf, but other aspects of the opinion offer grounding for those who take the opposite view.7
Part I then explains the benefits of allowing a society-wide debate to continue on issues of gay rights and considers the dangers were the Court to prematurely offer a definitive constitutional ruling on an issue about which citizens are deeply
divided and with respect to which societal norms are rapidly
changing.
That Lawrence has not decided the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage does not mean that DOMA necessarily is
constitutional. Years before Lawrence was decided, many of our
country’s finest public law scholars argued that DOMA lies beyond Congress’s powers. Parts II, III, and IV of the Article critically engage these arguments from Dean Larry Kramer, Professors Laurence Tribe, Joseph Singer, Andrew Koppelman,
and others. Of the many critiques the Article dissects, four arguments recur. First, several scholars have proffered Tenth
Amendment-type claims that DOMA violates state sovereignty
by interfering with a family law subject that appropriately falls
to the states. Part II shows that such arguments mischaracterize DOMA: the statute does not regulate family law as such,
but serves the quintessentially federal function of determining
the extraterritorial effect of state law.
Second, many DOMA critics aver that the statute undermines the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s fundamental principle
of unifying the country. Part II of the Article shows that such
7. Several other noted commentators have come to similar conclusions as
a matter of positive law. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1186 (2004); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004);
Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 30–31, 36 (2003). For a contrary view, see Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 8–9 (2005).
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arguments rest on a problematic oversimplification of full faith
and credit—the provision aims not only to unify but to preserve
meaningfully empowered states. Because DOMA is fully consistent with at least one of the principles of full faith and credit,
sweeping arguments that DOMA violates fundamental principles fail.
Third, virtually all scholarly critiques of DOMA have assumed that the statute purports to authorize states to deviate
from Supreme Court precedent regarding the enforcement of
judgments. This has been a predicate to their conclusion that
Congress overstepped its authority in enacting DOMA. Part II
shows, however, that DOMA’s rules actually fill a gap in the
Court’s jurisprudence in a manner fully consistent with precedent.
Fourth, the Article shows that several apparently disparate arguments leveled against DOMA turn out to be unargued
assertions that the Supreme Court has the final say in determining the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. To be
sure, this entire line of argumentation is irrelevant if, as I contend, DOMA fills a gap rather than alters the Supreme Court’s
baseline rules. But because the view that DOMA alters Supreme Court doctrine is so widespread, Part III forthrightly
analyzes the nature of Congress’s power under the so-called
“Effects Clause” to determine what full faith and credit requires.8
Part IV defends DOMA against a novel argument that Professor Joseph Singer of Harvard Law School recently advanced.9 Singer has argued that full faith and credit demands
that all states recognize a marriage that any sister state sanctions. Part IV shows that Singer’s position is contrary to more
than two centuries of jurisprudence and calls for the extension
of a single case that has proven to be deeply problematic. Further, the policy concerns that animate Singer’s proposal can be
addressed by means that do not interfere with state sovereignty in the drastic way Singer proposes. Unless and until the
Court decides (probably and properly under Lawrence-type due
8. The first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause states that
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The
second sentence provides that “the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof.” Id.
9. See Singer, supra note 7, at 31–46.
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process considerations) that states may not refuse to allow
same-sex couples to marry, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
should not prevent states from differing on matters about
which there is no constitutionally required national standard.
In the end, the Article concludes that DOMA is best understood as an instance of congressional participation in the process of defining our country’s constitutional culture. The Court
has not yet decided the constitutionality of same-sex marriage,
and DOMA reflects the political branches’ contribution—by
means of the institutional tools at their disposal—to the process of deciding how American constitutional culture should deal
with the incidents of gay life.
I. WHY LAWRENCE HAS NOT RENDERED
DOMA UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Lawrence opinion expressly stated that it was not deciding the constitutional status of same-sex marriage.10 Justice
Scalia disagreed, arguing in dissent that the logic of the majority’s analysis invariably leads to the conclusion that the Constitution requires that marriage be available to gays if it is available to heterosexuals. The majority opinion, said Justice Scalia,
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions,
insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” . . . what justification could there possibly be for denying the
benefits of marriage to [gays]? . . . This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that
principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this
Court.11

If Justice Scalia is correct, it would follow that DOMA—a
statute providing a federal definition for marriage that excludes same-sex unions and that purports to authorize states
not to recognize same-sex marriages from jurisdictions that accept such marriages—is unconstitutional.
Is Justice Scalia correct? Has the constitutionality of samesex marriage already been decided by the Court? I think not,
for three principle reasons.

10. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not . . . involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
11. Id. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A. REASONS INTERNAL TO THE OPINION ITSELF
The first reason involves considerations wholly internal to
the opinion itself. In addition to explicitly saying that it did not
decide the question of same-sex marriage, the majority opinion
contains principles in tension with one another that would
yield divergent same-sex marriage outcomes. As Professor
Robert Post has shown, in declaring Texas’s law unconstitutional, the Court reconfigured due process and equal protection
concerns into constitutional principles of respect, dignity, and
antistigma.12 At the same time, however, the Lawrence Court
preserved the public/private distinction,13 under which regulations targeting private conduct are deemed more intrusive and
hence more difficult to sustain, as it condemned Texas’s ban on
sodomy for penalizing sexual relations that occur in private.14
Although the principles of stigma, respect, and dignity certainly provide powerful arguments to those who wish to advocate that the Constitution forbids the denial of same-sex marriage,15 marriage is readily characterized as a “public” act and
accordingly could be argued to lie outside Lawrence’s holding.
Indeed, the Lawrence Court appears to expressly say as much
when formulating its “general rule” that government should
not “define the meaning of the relationship or . . . set its
boundaries absent . . . abuse of an institution the law protects.”16 Insofar as the prohibition of same-sex marriage typi12. See Post, supra note 7, at 97–101.
13. Although the public/private distinction has been subject to searing critiques over the years for being incoherent, see Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the
Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 199–201 (2004) (surveying such critiques),
the Court has given no indication that it is ready to abandon it. The analysis
above in text accordingly accepts the distinction’s continuing validity on positive grounds. Elsewhere I have defended the public/private distinction on
normative grounds. See id. at 201–06.
14. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not
involve public conduct . . . . The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”); id. at 567 (“[A]dults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives . . . .”); id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual.”). For other academic commentary that notes the Court’s retention of the private/public distinction in the Lawrence opinion, see Franke,
supra note 7, at 1401–04; and Post, supra note 7, at 101–03.
15. For some excellent examples, see Ball, supra note 7, at 1207–31; and
Note, supra note 1, at 2688–2707.
16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added); see Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
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cally is justified on the ground that doing so protects the institution of marriage,17 this language of the Lawrence opinion invites claims that allowing same-sex marriage would destabilize
the “institution” of marriage.18 For this reason, pace Justice
Scalia, the “logic” of the Lawrence opinion is not so unidirectional as to inexorably lead to any single result vis-à-vis samesex marriage.
B. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF LAWRENCE’S NOVEL PRINCIPLES
A second reason that Lawrence is best understood as not
deciding the constitutionality of same-sex marriage is that the
status of several of the opinion’s animating principles is uncertain. This uncertainty arises because several of Lawrence’s core
constitutional principles are novel, and many novel constitutional principles do not survive.
Much is new in Lawrence. Professor Post has shown that
the “[t]hemes of respect and stigma [that] are at the moral center of the Lawrence opinion . . . are entirely new to substantive
due process doctrine.”19 Similarly novel is the doubt Lawrence
casts on whether the majority’s moral opprobrium is a constitutional basis for criminalizing an activity.20
The durability of these aspects of Lawrence is uncertain
simply by virtue of their novelty. Though the Court sometimes
overturns well-entrenched constitutional principles,21 newly
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004).
17. This justification seems particularly unconvincing to me. For an interesting analysis of this claim that largely tracks my own, see Sam Fleischacker,
Civil Unions for Everyone, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 2004, at A17.
18. McGinnis and Lund suggest a similar interpretation of this line of the
opinion. See Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1584 & n.102 (2004).
19. Post, supra note 7, at 97.
20. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. The Court stated:
[T]he Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct
as immoral. . . . For many persons these are not trivial concerns but
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of
their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the
State to enforce these views on the whole of society through operation
of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code.”
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)); see also Ball, supra note 7, at 1221–22; Goldberg, supra note 16.
21. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (de-
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minted constitutional principles are more vulnerable because
the Court can narrow or ignore them without disturbing reams
of precedent. There are many examples of newly born constitutional principles of apparently broad scope whose development
has been dramatically limited by subsequent case law. For example, although several opinions in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that wealth was a suspect classification triggering strict
scrutiny under equal protection and due process doctrines,22
the Court decisively aborted this doctrinal revolution in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.23 The Court
quashed this constitutional revolution not because it lacked
“logic,”24 but more likely because it would have radically reworked society,25 potentially reshaping our polity into a nearsocialist system; indeed, the Rodgriguez Court seemed to say as
much.26
Consider as well what has become of the state action principle the Court famously announced in Shelley v. Kraemer.27
finitively rejecting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
22. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970) (“Here the Illinois statute as applied to Williams works an invidious discrimination solely
because he is unable to pay the fine.”); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (“Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like
those of race . . . are traditionally disfavored.” (internal citation omitted));
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1956) (“Providing equal justice for poor
and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. . . . [O]ur own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons.”).
23. 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973) (holding that legislative classifications having a
disparate impact on rich and poor trigger heightened scrutiny only where “because of their impecunity [the poor were] completely unable to pay for some
desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit”).
24. The argument that disparities in monies spent on public education
interfere with the “effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and [the]
intelligent utilization of the right to vote,” id. at 35, seems far from illogical.
25. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
683, 689 (2004) (“A court . . . cannot get too far ahead of public opinion.”).
26. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. The Court noted:
The logical limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the
significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the
ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment.
Id.
27. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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The Shelley Court attributed the substantive provisions of a
private contract to the state when the court was asked to enforce a racially restrictive covenant. Shelley’s approach, “consistently applied, would require individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as
almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of
potential judicial enforcement.”28 Although Shelley’s is not an
illogical conception of state action,29 Shelley’s principle, virtually everyone believes, has been limited to the context of race.30
I have suggested elsewhere that this limitation likely occurred
because so broadly extending constitutional limitations to private action would have reworked our society in ways inconsistent with American cultural sensibilities.31
In short, wealth classifications and Shelley’s state action
doctrine are examples of (then) novel constitutional principles
that became aborted constitutional revolutions. Similarly, today we cannot be certain what will become of the concepts of
respect and stigma, nor of the limits that Lawrence purports to
place on the role of moral considerations in criminal law. Each
of these novel constitutional principles has the potential of significantly reworking our society.32 Indeed, it is the recognition
that Lawrence’s principles could have profound implications on
American society that has led Professor Post to begin the process of locating limitations for the Court’s principle of respect.33
28. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d
ed. 1988).
29. See Rosen, supra note 13, at 200–03.
30. See id. at 190–99. In fact, the Supreme Court even has been reluctant
to apply Shelley in other cases of racial discrimination, but instead has nearly
confined Shelley to its facts. See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers 7–10 (Jan. 16, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
31. See Rosen, supra note 13, at 201–06.
32. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The law, it is said, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.” (internal quotation
omitted)).
33. See Post, supra note 7, at 98. Post finds it
unlikely that Lawrence intends to authorize persons to demand from
the state affirmative indicia of respect, both because this would impose an unusual positive obligation on the state, and because it is entirely unclear what such indicia might be. It is therefore more plausible to interpret Lawrence as prohibiting the state from stigmatizing
or demeaning the private lives of persons.
Id.
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Perhaps courts will take up Post’s suggested limitations. Perhaps others will be created. Or perhaps the principles themselves will be left undeveloped.
To conclude, the uncertain future of the many new constitutional principles identified in Lawrence—an uncertainty generated by their very novelty—constitutes a second reason why
the opinion should not be viewed as having answered the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.
C. THE BENEFITS OF MULTILATERAL PARTICIPATION
The third reason for not prematurely construing Lawrence
as having answered the constitutionality of same-sex marriage
is that doing so eliminates the benefits of multiple actors in society offering their views of what the Constitution requires. I
cannot hope in this Article to demonstrate definitively these
advantages. But I can suggest that those who agree with the
many academics from across the political spectrum who advocate that societal institutions apart from the Court play an important role in shaping constitutional meaning34 should be in34. A broad array of scholars from across the political spectrum have
championed the role of actors apart from the Supreme Court in interpreting
the Constitution, including John Harrison, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Thomas
Merrill, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher, Robert Post, Jeremy Waldron, Keith Whittington, Cass Sunstein, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 24–45 (1999) (recognizing that elected government and citizens properly play a role in constitutional interpretation); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181–82 (1999) (advancing the theory
that the people are proper constitutional interpreters); Neal Devins & Louis
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 98–
104 (1998) (advocating that neither of the other branches of the federal government nor the people should “subjugate their constitutional judgments to
those of the Supreme Court” (quoting Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382
(1997))); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 372–73 (1988) (arguing
that the legislative and executive branches have the power to offer independent interpretations); Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement
Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149, 1188–1201 (1998) (discussing state
courts as constitutional interpreters); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right
This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987) (discussing the legislative and executive branches’ roles in interpreting the Constitution); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 76, 79 (1993) (suggesting that judicial opinions are merely
“explanations for judgments” and accordingly “lack the power to bind the other
branches”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (arguing that the executive branch has the power to offer its own independent interpretation of the
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clined to take seriously the Court’s statement in Lawrence that
the decision did not resolve the question of same-sex marriage.
This is because, as a purely descriptive matter, actors in society
apart from the Supreme Court are more apt to develop and advance their own views of what the Constitution requires if the
Court has not already definitively offered its constitutional ruling on the question.35
Two benefits of multilateral participation in constitutional
decision making that commentators have identified are particularly applicable to the context of same-sex marriage.36
1. Varying Institutional Competencies
First, courts, like all societal institutions, have their particular institutional strengths and weaknesses,37 and resolving
the constitutional dimensions of same-sex marriage may call on
information that courts are not particularly well suited to gathering and assessing. One of the principal arguments against
same-sex marriage is the claim that it will endanger the institution of heterosexual marriage. It is plausible that the answer
to this question is constitutionally relevant; Lawrence seems to
say this very thing.38 Yet courts are not institutionally suited to

Constitution); Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Power and Popular Sovereignty, in
MARBURY VERSUS MADISON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 181 (Mark A.
Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV.
773 (2002); see also LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 233–48 (2004) (critiquing “judicial
supremacy” and advocating a return to a form of “popular constitutionalism,”
under which the Court’s understanding of the Constitution does not necessarily trump society’s constitutional understandings).
35. There is evidence that many nonjudicial societal actors by and large
have accepted the regime of judicial hegemony described in Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution.”). See Devins & Fisher, supra note 34, at 83–84.
36. I believe that deeper considerations regarding the nature of constitutional doctrine provide yet additional reasons to favor multilateral participation in constitutional decision making. A work-in-progress of mine examines
these, but space limitations preclude my discussing them here.
37. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 35–52 (2001) (discussing the strengths and
limitations of the adjudicative process); Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing
Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1978–84, 1990 (1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 34).
38. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (stating that government should not “define the meaning of the relationship or . . . set its boundaries absent . . . abuse of an institution the law protects”).
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fact gathering of this sort.39 The empirical information simply
might not be available at the time of litigation. This would
seem to be the case with the effects of same-sex marriage on
heterosexual marriage, as gay marriage has been legal in the
United States for only a short period of time. Moreover, even
where information is available, courts are not well suited to
conducting social science research. For instance, the information they receive is filtered by the litigants, and the rules of discovery and evidence (including the burdens of proof that each
party carries) may not be appropriate to the conduct of valid social scientific inquiry.
Finally, the advance of scientific and social scientific
knowledge virtually always involves the correction of initial
hypotheses, and there are problematic institutional costs to
correcting social scientific errors in Supreme Court opinions.
The Court’s determinations have precedential value and are
protected by the principle of stare decisis. Legislative determinations (and, all the more so, administrative guidelines) enjoy
no such institutional conservatism. Accordingly, they may be
easier to undo if contrary information later emerges throwing
into question the facts on which a legislative determination was
premised.
2. Democratic Legitimacy
A second advantage of multilateral participation in constitutional decision making some commentators identify is that it
can enhance democratic legitimacy.40 To be sure, the relationship between constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy derives from one’s conception of constitutional law and for that
reason is hotly contested. Those who conceptualize the Constitution as a historical record of the commitments our political
community has made and who understand constitutional interpretation as the elaboration of those historical commitments41
may not view multilateral participation as enhancing constitutional legitimacy. Rather, fidelity to past commitments may be
39. See Devins, supra note 37, at 1978–79.
40. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 34; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section 5 Power: Policentric Interpretation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 (2003); Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section 5 Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2003).
41. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–117 (2004).
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both necessary and sufficient to secure democratic legitimacy
for those of this view.
For theorists who understand constitutional law in more
evolutionary terms, however, multilateral participation can
play a crucial role vis-à-vis democratic legitimacy. If constitutional law is the domain where society’s most fundamental
commitments are progressively elaborated, then it is not clear
why courts should be the only participants in this process.42
The Court’s practice of engaging in proactive constitutional
hermeneutics reflecting values removed from the contemporary
societal consensus and not readily located in constitutional text
or in history threatens democratic legitimacy. Moreover, when
the Court seeks to situate itself at the vanguard of cultural
change, it can interrupt the process by which society arrives at
a consensus on its own: ordinary democratic politics and the
cultural redefinition that invariably occurs over time. Constitutionalizing a matter, and thereby removing it from democratic
politics, also can serve to radicalize opponents.
Drawing on these considerations, several noted scholars
have questioned the extent to which Brown v. Board of Education,43 long conceptualized as the paragon of appropriate judicial proactiveness, is properly credited with advancing the
cause of racial desegregation.44 All support the cause of desegregation and racial equality, but these scholars’ works cast
doubt on the propriety and efficacy of the Supreme Court’s assumption of a position at the vanguard of cultural change as
they highlight the important roles that other societal institutions play in refiguring constitutional culture.
This sort of conceptual schema relating to democratic legitimacy led Professor Post to explain Lawrence’s aforemen-

42. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at xiv (promoting the position that
broad-based deliberation about constitutional ideals is among “a democratic
nation’s highest aspirations”).
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290–442
(2004); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION passim (2004);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39–169 (1991). For an excellent review of these and other recent
works that critically analyze the legacy of Brown, see Cass R. Sunstein, Did
Brown Matter?, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 102. For a sharp critique of Professor Klarman’s book, see Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context:
In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2005) (book review).
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tioned open-endedness, ambiguities, and internal contradictions as making the opinion “an opening bid in a conversation
between the Court and the American public”45 on the constitutional status of the incidents of gay life. As a matter of positive
law, I agree with Post’s observation,46 with the caveat that
Lawrence is not the opening bid—other societal actors, such as
Congress in DOMA, already had registered their views on this
question. The recognition that Lawrence has not decided all issues on gay rights allows other societal actors to add their
voices in the ongoing process of elaborating our constitutional
culture.
The analysis up to this point has been positive rather than
normative. Before closing, a few words should be said about the
normative question of whether it is good that the Court has left
undecided many constitutional questions relating to gay life;
after all, the mere fact that multilateral participation can be
beneficial does not mean that the Court should never take a
lead role in seeking to resolve a controversial issue.47 Unfortunately, there is no widely agreed upon, adequately theorized
account as to when the Court appropriately takes up the vanguard or the rear guard on issues of cultural change. Although
I do not purport to develop a fully elaborated framework here,
relevant considerations likely include the following: (1) whether
the constitutional judgment rests on empirical facts about
which there does not exist sufficient consensus among experts,
(2) the extent to which the issue is hotly contested in general
culture, (3) the risks the Court’s imposing a single constitu-

45. Post, supra note 7, at 11.
46. Professors Lund and McGinnis argue that “[t]his conversation is a fiction” because the people of the states cannot communicate disagreement with
the Court by “reenacting their statutes.” Because “[t]his is a ‘conversation’ in
which the Court issues commands, and those who disagree must obey, . . . the
dialogue between the Court and the public [is] a pretty one sided conversation.” Lund & McGinnis, supra note 18, at 1587–88. Lund and McGinnis’s
point is well taken with regard to statutes criminalizing sodomy (at least under conventional theories of judicial review), but Post makes the different
point that the potential of meaningful exchange between nonjudicial society
members and the Supreme Court still exists vis-à-vis the entire spectrum of
issues concerning gays (such as gay marriage) that have not been decided by
the opinion. Moreover, the possibility of meaningful conversation remains
even with respect to issues (such as statutes that criminalize sodomy) that
have been decided by the Court insofar as the Court from time to time overturns earlier decided cases.
47. For an insightful elaboration of this point, see Devins, supra note 37,
at 1973.
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tional rule pose to societal stability,48 and (4) the risks vis-à-vis
our constitutional culture of the Court’s not intervening.
Taking account of these considerations, there may be good
reasons to applaud Lawrence’s explicit decision to leave many
things undecided. To begin, the first three factors enumerated
above suggest that the Court should not take the lead on gay
rights more than it already has. The fourth factor is less clear.
Does the Court’s willingness to tolerate a constitutional culture
in which heterosexuals are permitted to marry but gays may
not mean accepting a circumstance so at odds with constitutional principles that it risks undermining the legitimacy of the
Constitution itself in the eyes of its citizenry? The fact that
American constitutional culture for so long has tolerated far
worse (the criminalizing of homosexual sex, for example) suggests not. Conversely, judicial activism with regard to hotly
contested social issues risks undermining judicial authority
and constitutional culture.49
Another relevant consideration is whether the Court’s inaction is likely to stymie the process of cultural change. Where
majorities have a stranglehold on the airways of cultural and
political change, there would appear to be a particularly strong
reason for a nonmajoritarian institution like the Court to play
an active role.50 Even without court intervention, however,
there have been significant changes in societal attitudes towards gays over the last decade. In an environment of (relatively) rapidly changing social norms, there may be less need
for the Court to intervene definitively at an early time and take
a constitutional position on matters still deeply controversial.
Judicial imposition of gay marriage on an unwilling citizenry (polls show that strong majorities of Americans today oppose gay marriage51) perhaps would hinder the softening of
American culture’s opposition to gay marriage. The high court
of Massachusetts’s decision that its state constitution required
gay marriage appears to have been the impetus behind the
48. This includes such considerations as the “risks of elected government
reprisals to unpopular decisionmaking.” Id. at 1979.
49. Though judicial authority and constitutional culture are analytically
distinct concepts, the two tend to be melded together in our world of judicial
supremacy in which the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution
typically is thought to constitute the authoritative exposition of what the Constitution requires. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 34, at 83–84.
50. See Devins, supra note 37, at 1991.
51. See Opposition to Gay Marriage Grows, CBS NEWS, Dec. 21, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/19/opinion/polls/main589551.shtml.
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Marriage Protection Amendment, later defeated in the Senate.52 A CBS News/New York Times poll found that opposition
to gay marriage increased following the Massachusetts decision.53 Would the result in the Senate have been different had
the Supreme Court announced a federal constitutional right to
gay marriage in Lawrence?
D. CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHAT LAWRENCE DID AND DID NOT DO
What I have argued up to this point does not mean that the
Supreme Court appropriately assumes a position of “absolute”
neutrality54 on gay marriage at a time like this. There are perspectives particular to the Court’s institutional strengths that
ought to be put into the mix of viewpoints that help to shape
the cultural perspectives that ultimately will inform the hard
doctrine. The Court’s strengths include identifying the overarching principles that help constitute our political culture.55
Fairly read, the Lawrence Court did not remain absolutely neutral, for the Court identified a set of constitutional principles
that provide significant traction for gay rights advocates.56 But
nonneutrality is not the same thing as finally deciding a question. For the reasons discussed above, the ambiguities, internally contradictory principles, and novel principles in Lawrence
mean we should take seriously its express statements that it
did not resolve other gay rights issues, including gay marriage.
The Court weighed in on these issues, but it did not decide
them.
52. See Helen Dewar & Alan Cooperman, Senate Scuttles Amendment
Banning Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49537-2004Jul14.html.
53. See Opposition to Gay Marriage Grows, supra note 51 (reporting that
opposition to gay marriage increased nationally from fifty-five percent to sixtyone percent in the month following the Massachusetts decision).
54. Even assuming there is such a thing, that is.
55. These principles typically do not, on their own, as a matter of “principle and logic,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), dictate outcomes in particular cases because cases typically are junctions
where multiple principles collide, each principle pointing in a different direction as to how the matter ought to be resolved. The harmonization of incommensurable principles is not the result of pure logic but instead is a subjective process in which societal actors apart from the Supreme Court have
crucial roles to play. See infra notes 195–98 and accompanying text (discussing
incommensurability). A work-in-progress more fully explores incommensurability in the context of constitutional doctrine. See Mark D. Rosen, A Cultural
Approach to Constitutional Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
56. See Post, supra note 7, at 97–101.
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As a consequence, I conclude that Lawrence did not render
the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional. The opinion
arms DOMA’s opponents with an assortment of new weapons.
Those who deploy them undoubtedly will use the usual advocate’s rhetoric of speaking as if what (in their minds) should be
already is. But the various societal actors should not be fooled
by this into thinking that the constitutionality of the various
incidents of gay life has been decided. It has not. Nonjudicial
actors in society remain free to call on the principles floated by
the Lawrence Court, as well as other resources,57 to press their
views as to what the Constitution does and does not require.
This critical job is a task that I do not intend to pursue here in
this Article. Rather than argue what should be, this Article
only seeks to identify what is: the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage has not yet been decided, and DOMA has not been
rendered a nullity by the Lawrence decision. At least not yet.
II. RECURRING PRE-LAWRENCE CRITIQUES OF
DOMA’S CONSTITUTIONALITY
Even before Lawrence, many of the country’s leading public
law scholars argued that DOMA was unconstitutional. The Article’s next three Parts seek to answer these scholars’ critiques.
In so doing, the Article identifies the constitutional bases for
congressional power to enact DOMA (primarily the Effects
Clause of Article IV, Section 1) and explains why DOMA does
not violate any constitutional side-constraints.
More specifically, Part II dissects four claims regarding
DOMA’s unconstitutionality, each of which has been advanced
by multiple scholars. Two of the arguments rest on demonstrably incorrect assumptions. The other two arguments tacitly assume that the Supreme Court has the final say in determining
what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires. Part III forthrightly analyzes this crucial question concerning Congress’s
and the President’s powers under the Effects Clause. The critics’ second set of constitutional challenges dissolves under the
interpretation of the Effects Clause proffered in Part III. Part
IV defends DOMA against an additional Full Faith and Credit
57. See supra note 34. What other resources and methodologies (apart
from precedent) are appropriately utilized by societal actors apart from the
Supreme Court when they work out constitutional meaning? This is a very
important, undertheorized question. For an excellent start at answering this,
see Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1335 (2001).
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Clause-based challenge that a highly regarded scholar has advanced.
Before proceeding, it is useful to briefly situate DOMA in
the context of full faith and credit jurisprudence. The Constitution states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State”58 without differentiating among acts, records, and judicial proceedings. The Court’s jurisprudence,
however, has long treated each of these categories differently.
Under today’s case law, states have a virtually ironclad obligation to give effect to judgments from sister states59 but are virtually never required to apply another state’s acts or records.60
Marriage is not a judgment but instead is either a “public act”
or “record.”61 For this reason, although states typically give effect to marriages that were valid where the marriage occurred,
nearly everyone agrees that this so-called “place of celebration
rule” is a state common-law rule rather than a constitutional
mandate.62 Unlike a constitutional mandate, state law can
override a common-law rule—for example, under a publicpolicy exception, a sister state’s law need not be applied if doing
so would violate a strong public policy of the forum.
Thus, even without DOMA, there is strong authority for
concluding that states would not be subject to a constitutional
obligation to give effect to a same-sex marriage performed in
another state. By contrast, most commentators believe that a
forum state would be required under full faith and credit
precedent to recognize and enforce a sister-state judgment
based on a law that recognized same-sex marriages.63 The gen58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
59. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 231–36 (1998).
60. If application of the forum’s substantive law is consistent with due
process, then application of its law also will not be deemed to violate the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08
(1980); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 824 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that contemporary
doctrine “treats the two relevant constitutional provisions [the Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Clauses] as though they imposed the same constraints
on the forum court”).
61. David P. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2D
7, 10–11 (1997).
62. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 10. For my critical analysis of a
prominent scholar’s recent argument that full faith and credit makes the place
of celebration rule a constitutional requirement, see infra Part IV.
63. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School, to
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (May 24, 1996), in 142 CONG. REC. S5931, S5932–33

ROSEN_3FMT

934

04/18/2006 03:28:45 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:915

eral view is that DOMA purports to authorize states to deviate
from the ordinary requirements of full faith and credit doctrine
regarding foreign judgments.64 In the view of most scholars
who believe DOMA to be constitutional, Congress had the
power to authorize such deviations on the basis of its powers
under the so-called “Effects Clause”—which provides that “the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof”65—when it enacted DOMA.66 I take a different
view: although I agree that Congress has the power to provide
different rules than those laid down by the Court, I argue that
DOMA properly understood is not inconsistent with the Court’s
precedents.
A. FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
An oft-repeated critique is that DOMA is unconstitutional
because it flatly subverts the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s
foundational principle. According to Dean Larry Kramer, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause “represents the very idea of what
it means to be in a Union. States are required to recognize and
respect each other’s laws because that is what members of a
federation do.”67 Professor Andrew Koppelman similarly argues
that “[t]he preeminent purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is to promote uniformity of result across the nation.”68
Professor Laurence Tribe likewise has spoken of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause’s “nationally unifying shield”69 and quoted
language from the hoary case of Hughes v. Fetter70 that spoke of
“the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each
state of the obligations or rights created or recognized
by . . . sister states.”71 All of these scholars have argued that
(daily ed. June 6, 1996) [hereinafter Tribe Letter]; Koppelman, supra note 4,
at 22; Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006.
64. See Tribe Letter, supra note 63; Koppelman, supra note 4, at 22;
Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006.
65. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930.
67. Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006.
68. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 22.
69. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932.
70. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
71. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5933 (omission in original) (quoting
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951)).
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DOMA is unconstitutional because it runs counter to this foundational principle of unification insofar as it provides that
states need not give effect to other states’ acts or judgments
“respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”72
These arguments rest on an incomplete conception of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause’s purposes. It is true that the
Court’s rhetoric sometimes suggests that unification is all that
full faith and credit is about.73 Case law makes clear, however,
that the Clause aims not only at unifying the states, but also at
ensuring that the states remain meaningfully empowered, distinct polities.74 In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, for example, the Court permitted California to apply its own workmen’s compensation statute to a
Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts employer who had
been injured while in California in the course of his employment.75 The Supreme Court held that “[t]he full faith and credit
clause does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting
statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect
to the same persons and events.”76 As the italicized language indicates, the Court understood that the full faith and credit doc-

72. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
73. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (“The
animating purpose of the full faith and credit command, as this Court explained in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935), ‘was to
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties,
each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of
right, irrespective of the state of its origin.’ Id., at 277.”).
74. Stated differently, the principle of unification is not unalloyed, but is
tempered by a concern for preserving state autonomy, as will be discussed
above in text. To be sure, this second aspect of full faith and credit received far
less attention by the Founders than the goal of unification. See generally
Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998)
(setting forth the historical groundwork for the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and discussing its varied historic and contemporary interpretations). This is
not surprising, for the pressing problem at that time was unifying states that,
if anything, were too sovereign. As the Union became stable, the second component of full faith and credit—guarding state sovereignty—emerged in the
case law, as will be discussed in text.
75. 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
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trine it was fashioning would have allowed a Massachusetts
court to apply Massachusetts law on the identical facts had the
lawsuit been filed in Massachusetts instead of California. This
is still the state of the law.77
The outcome in Pacific Employers is inexplicable if the Full
Faith and Credit Clause is conceptualized in the manner propounded by Dean Kramer and Professors Koppelman and
Tribe. Notwithstanding Koppelman’s description of full faith
and credit, Pacific Employers does not “promote uniformity of
result across the nation.”78 Just the opposite is true: the Court
itself recognized that the law applied would turn entirely on
whether the lawsuit was filed in California or Massachusetts.
Contrary to Tribe’s view, the case is not readily characterized
as reflecting the principle of “maximum enforcement in each
state of the obligations or rights created or recognized
by . . . sister states.”79 Similarly, it cannot be said that the case
required that California “recognize and respect [Massachusetts’s] laws because that is what members of a federation
do,”80 pace the understanding of full faith and credit proffered
by Dean Kramer.
By contrast, Pacific Employers is readily understandable
on recognizing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause aims not
just at unification but also at protecting each state’s sovereignty. The Court stated explicitly:
To the extent that California is required to give full faith and
credit to the conflicting Massachusetts statute it must be denied the
right to apply in its own courts its own statute, constitutionally enacted in pursuance of its [own] policy . . . .
. . . While the purpose of [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] was to
preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity
in other states, the very nature of the federal union of states, to which
are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to
the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to
substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.81

77. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) (“[S]ince the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it is frequently the case under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of
one State or the contrary law of another.”).
78. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 22.
79. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5933 (omission in original) (quoting
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951)).
80. Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006.
81. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501
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The Full Faith and Credit Clause’s coordinate concerns for
both unification and meaningful state autonomy could not have
been stated more clearly.
In short, the scholars discussed above oversimplify full
faith and credit. It is not solely concerned with union, but with
union of a certain kind: a union of meaningfully empowered
subfederal polities.82 Analysis considering only one pole in a
dialectic is methodologically suspect. Unfortunately, myopic obsession with only one of the Clause’s dual principles infects the
arguments of the scholars discussed above.83
One may object that the notion that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause incorporates twin goals in tension with one another applies to public acts but not to judgments. Such an objection is unavailing for three reasons. First, any such distinction is not analytically sensible because the tension between
unification and maintaining meaningful state autonomy is present not only when a state is asked to apply a sister state’s law
but also when it is asked to apply a sister state’s judgment.84
Second, the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause suggests
that acts and judgments implicate similar issues, for the
Clause addresses both acts and judgments in a single sentence
and by its terms applies the same rule to each. Finally, as a
purely descriptive matter, it cannot be said that the full faith
and credit doctrine resolves the tension by permitting the prin(1939). This is not to say that I agree with the case’s ultimate holding. My disagreement stems not from a view that the Clause advances only one purpose,
but because I think the Court gave inadequate weight to Massachusetts’s interest. I hope to pursue this line of inquiry in a future work.
82. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the “federal interest in national unity” by ensuring that states do not “unjustifiably
infring[e] upon the legitimate interests of another State”).
83. There are two ways that this point may be conceptualized: first, that
there are two competing principles, unification and state autonomy; or second,
that there is a single principle of unifying states that retain certain autonomy.
I do not perceive any meaningful difference between the two formulations for
present purposes, and hereinafter my analysis utilizes only the former “dual
principle” approach.
84. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236–38 (1908). Requiring
state A to enforce a judgment from state B that is based on state B ’s misapplication of state A’s law facilitates unification (insofar as a judgment from the
court of one state can be enforced everywhere else), but does so at the expense
of state A’s sovereign interests. Recognizing these tensions has important implications for the appropriate roles that societal institutions apart from the
Supreme Court play in elaborating what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires. See infra Part III.C.3.
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ciple of unification to prevail in one context (judgments) and
state autonomy to prevail in the other (acts). Although it is true
that full faith and credit doctrine with regard to judgments
typically favors unification insofar as the judgments of sister
states almost always must be recognized, there are several
types of judgments that sister states need not recognize.85
These exceptions have been justified on the ground that requiring recognition would unduly interfere with the forum state’s
autonomy.86 Conversely, full faith and credit sometimes requires state courts to apply another state’s law notwithstanding a forum policy to do otherwise.87
What does all this mean for DOMA? Whereas DOMA is incompatible on its face with the oversimplified conception of full
faith and credit articulated by the scholars discussed above, it
is consistent with the enriched conception of full faith and
credit. This is so because DOMA is a statute that resolves the
tension between unification and state autonomy in favor of the
latter. Because the Full Faith and Credit Clause seeks to advance principles that are in tension with one another, and because DOMA is compatible with one of these principles, it cannot be said that DOMA is flatly incompatible with the Full
Faith and Credit Clause on the basis of first principles.
B. TENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
1. Interference with State Prerogatives
Professors Laurence Tribe and Stanley Cox both argue that
DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment. Tribe suggests that
85. For example, a forum state need not recognize a sister state’s decree
concerning land ownership that seeks to transfer title in the forum state, see
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 13 (1909), nor give effect to an antisuit injunction
issued by a sister state, see Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236
(1998). For further discussion of these exceptions, see infra Part II.C.
86. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 238 (holding that a Michigan judgment precluding a party from testifying cannot “control courts elsewhere by precluding
them, in actions brought by strangers to the [issuing state’s] litigation, from
determining for themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and what
evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth”); id. at 240
(declaring that the issuing state’s “power does not reach into a Missouri courtroom to displace the forum’s own determination whether to admit or exclude
evidence”); Fall, 215 U.S. at 10, 12 (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause “does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one state to property
situated in another” and that holding otherwise would violate the policy of the
forum state).
87. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
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Congress does not have the power to “exempt” a narrow “category of judgments” from the requirements of full faith and
credit.88 He says that DOMA “create[s] a precedent dangerous
to the very idea of a United States of America.”89 If DOMA is
permissible, then Congress can pick and choose any substantive field governed by state law—let’s say commercial judgments—and render “any State’s official acts, on any subject, to
second-class status” that need not receive full faith and credit,
undermining the “Tenth Amendment’s unambiguous language,
that ours is a National Government whose powers are limited
to those enumerated in the Constitution itself.”90 Cox similarly
argues that DOMA is unconstitutional because it is “solely substantive rather than jurisdictionally based” and hence is not
“content neutral.”91 “[B]ecause it invalidates state judgments
based on their content alone,” says Cox, “DOMA thereby vitiates state sovereignty.”92
Under contemporary Tenth Amendment doctrines, these
arguments are parasitic on the conclusion that the Effects
Clause does not authorize Congress to enact DOMA. The Court
has held that “whether an Act of Congress invades the province
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment” is a
“mirror image[]” of the question of “whether an act of Congress
is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress . . . in . . . the Constitution.”93 DOMA accordingly invades
the province of sovereignty only if it is not authorized under the
Effects Clause. The question at hand is whether DOMA falls
within Congress’s Effects Clause powers. The arguments advanced by Tribe and Cox do not answer this question but instead assume the conclusion that subject-matter-specific legislation is not authorized by the scope of the Effects Clause.
Perhaps Tribe’s and Cox’s Tenth Amendment claims can be
construed as policy arguments for not interpreting the Effects
Clause in a manner that would subvert state sovereignty. If so,
their arguments are premised on a distorted understanding of
what DOMA does. Tribe’s and Cox’s stated beliefs that Con88. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and
Domestic Relations Conflicts Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063, 1081–82
(1999).
92. Id. at 1064.
93. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–56 (1992).
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gress should not be able to use the Effects Clause to “modify or
displace substantive state policy” with regard to subject matters that fall outside of Congress’s appropriate regulatory powers drive their arguments.94 Such assertions fail because
DOMA does not “modify or displace substantive state policy” or
“replace state substantive policy with Congressional value
preferences.”95 For example, Massachusetts’s decision to permit
same-sex marriages is neither modified nor displaced.
What DOMA does regulate, however, is a quintessentially
federal function, and for that reason the statute does not implicate Tenth Amendment considerations. DOMA regulates the
extraterritorial effects of the Massachusetts law and of Massachusetts records and judgments that are based on that law.
Setting the scope of subfederal polities’ extraterritorial powers
naturally falls within the federal government’s purview because subfederal polities are apt to pursue only their state interests and systematically discount the externalities they impose on other subfederal polities. The federal polity is more
likely to take account of the interests of all subfederal polities
because Congress contains representatives from all the subfederal polities, whereas state governments obviously do not. Furthermore, the federal polity is institutionally charged with the
responsibility of looking out for the interests of the Union.
These considerations have led many commentators to argue
that Congress should create a federal choice-of-law statute.96
These considerations also have been invoked to explain why
Congress can displace dormant Commerce Clause limitations
on state protectionist legislation.97
In short, DOMA does not regulate substantive state policies that properly fall to the states. Rather, DOMA regulates
the extraterritorial effects of state policies—an eminently federal function that accordingly does not improperly trench on
state sovereignty.

94. Cox, supra note 91, at 1075.
95. Id.
96. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 301
(1992) (arguing that Congress’s Effects Clause powers are considerable and
citing several scholars who “agree[ ] that [this] includes power to specify
choice-of-law rules”).
97. See Mark D. Rosen, A Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1571–75 (2005).
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2. Subject-Matter-Specific Congressional Enactments
Tribe’s and Cox’s Tenth Amendment arguments impliedly
raise the question of whether Congress can appropriately determine the extraterritorial effects of one state’s acts on a subject-matter basis.98 There is a plausible textual basis to conclude not: the Effects Clause, after all, states that Congress
“may by general laws” prescribe the effect of acts, records, and
proceedings,99 and one might argue that subject-matter-specific
legislation is not a “general” law.100 There is an alternative
plausible interpretation of the language of “general laws,”101
however, and there are strong reasons to reject a construction
of the Effects Clause that would prevent Congress from enacting subject-matter-specific legislation.
First, to the extent that patterns of congressional behavior
are instructive in interpreting constitutional provisions,102 it is
98. See Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932 (arguing that Congress does
not have the power to “exempt” a narrow “category of judgments” from the requirements of full faith and credit); Cox, supra note 91, at 1082 (arguing that
DOMA is unconstitutional because its rules are “substantive rather than
jurisdictionally based”).
99. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
100. A student comment makes this textual argument. See Julie L.B. Johnson, Comment, The Meaning of “General Laws”: The Extent of Congress’s
Power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1639–40, 1643 (1997). The
comment argues that “Congress’s power under the Clause [is] to be exercised
only in broad strokes, and not narrowly to determine the effect of particular
acts, records, and proceedings,” and that DOMA accordingly is constitutionally
suspect because it deals with only a “narrow group” of “proceedings within
th[e] class” of marriages. Id. The author has provided neither legislative history nor case law to support it. In text, I provide precedent- and policy-based
reasons for rejecting such an interpretation.
101. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Effects Clause’s reference to “general
laws” might mean that Congress does not have the power to enact legislation
that addresses only individual cases. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 967 (7th ed. 2004). Such a limitation would
parallel the Constitution’s ban on bills of attainder, which prevents states
from enacting legislation that imposes punishments on specified individuals.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
102. Several constitutional doctrines treat the longstanding practices of the
coordinate branches of government as evidence of constitutionality. See, e.g.,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (indicating that Congress’s acquiescence to or authorization of the President’s seizure of private property during national emergencies
supports the constitutionality of such acts); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683
(1892) (noting that the longstanding practice of Congress delegating authority
to the President under the Taxing Clause “is entitled to great weight”); see
also David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
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notable that Congress has enacted legislation addressing the
effects of laws and judgments limited to discrete subject matters: there are separate federal statutes on child custody orders, child support orders, and protective orders in relation to
domestic violence.103 Moreover, as Professor Emily Sack has
shown, “Congress has in fact been selective in determining
which judgments will be entitled to full faith and credit, based
on policy choices” in the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act
(PKPA).104 For example, although the PKPA generally grants
full faith and credit status only to custody judgments rendered
in the state in which a child currently lives, it permits a nonabducting parent to bring custody proceedings in his or her own
state.105 Despite the fact that the child’s new state of residence
might “have a connection that is equal, and arguably, more significant than the state permitted to have jurisdiction,” Congress likely “did not want to penalize a parent who remained in
a state after the other parent had abducted the child to another
state.”106 By effectively discriminating against state laws based
on policy choices, Congress has legislated in a manner inconsistent with Tribe’s and Cox’s theories. While the two professors
are free to conclude that the PKPA and these other statutes are
unconstitutional insofar as the statutes deviate from their
theories, the above-noted pattern of congressional practice coupled with the absence of constitutional challenges suggest that
it is the scholarly theories, rather than the several statutes,
that require reworking.
Second, it is desirable for Congress to have the power to
enact laws that are subject-matter sensitive. There are strong
reasons to believe that an intelligent full faith and credit doctrine is not amenable to broad, transsubstantive rules but invariably will be highly context sensitive. This is due to the two
190, 201 (1988) (explaining that “it is a commonplace that a legislative judgment that a statute is constitutional is generally entitled to some deference
from a court, especially when that judgment is made after detailed consideration of the constitutional question”); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845,
872–76 (1996) (book review) (discussing some scholars’ view that congressional
practice is relevant to ascertaining the Constitution’s allocation powers with
regard to declaring war).
103. See infra note 187 (enumerating these statutes).
104. See Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full
Faith and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of
Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 827, 895 (2004).
105. Id. at 894.
106. Id. at 894–95.
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oft-conflicting principles that animate full faith and credit: creating (1) a national union of (2) meaningfully empowered subfederal polities. Full faith and credit doctrine must be context
sensitive because, although enforcing another state’s laws or
judgments always advances the cause of national unity, the
burden imposed on the forum state will be a function of the
substance of the law or judgment itself.
Experience and theory confirm the inadequacy of abstract,
transsubstantive rules for purposes of full faith and credit doctrine. Consider first the Supreme Court’s full faith and credit
jurisprudence itself. Notwithstanding broad pronouncements
that judgments from sister states must be enforced,107 the
Court has recognized several exceptions.108 Additional evidence
of the inadequacy of transsubstantive laws in the full faith and
credit context can be found in the related field of choice of law.
Virtually everyone agrees that the Effects Clause “includes
power to specify choice-of-law rules.”109 In this regard, it is empirically instructive that efforts to create transsubstantive solutions to conflicts-of-law quandaries have proven inadequate.110 There are strong theoretical reasons to think that

107. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“Regarding judgments . . . the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.”).
108. See, e.g., id. at 236 (determining that a forum state need not give effect to an antisuit injunction issued by a sister state); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S.
1, 10–12 (1909) (determining that a forum state need not recognize a sister
state’s decree concerning land ownership that seeks to transfer title in the forum state).
109. See Laycock, supra note 96, at 301.
110. Though the Second Restatement of Conflicts may not receive appropriate criticism for its transsubstantive character insofar as it does distinguish
between contracts, property, and torts, the Restatement’s core legal test—
Section 6’s “most significant relationship” test and its accompanying list of
considerations—provides the applicable legal rules for all these areas. See
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 60–63 (4th ed. 2004).
In the context of this Article, it is impossible to fully demonstrate that the
inadequacy of the Second Restatement of Conflicts is attributable in no small
part to its transsubstantive character. Although most scholars agree that the
Second Restatement of Conflicts has not been a success, see generally Friedrich
K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403 (2000) (presenting a symposium on whether the Second Restatement should be discarded and
replaced by a new Restatement), there are many possible explanations for the
Restatement’s failures. The answer, in my view, is that three factors have contributed to the Restatement’s deficiencies: (1) the Restatement’s authors did not
make decisions among the various approaches to choice of law but instead
adopted virtually all of them, thereby creating an unprincipled grab bag; (2)
the Restatement adopted the wrong choice-of-law rules; and (3) the effort to
create transsubstantive conflicts rules is misbegotten.
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transsubstantive choice-of-law rules are doomed to be inadequate, if not wholesale failures. Nearly all contemporary approaches to choice of law understand it not as a distinct body of
“procedural” law but instead as an aspect of the substantive
law. A bit of background is necessary to make this clear. Choice
of law determines which polity’s law governs a transaction or
occurrence that cuts across more than a single polity. Perhaps
the most important insight of interest analysis, an insight that
virtually all contemporary approaches to choice of law have
adopted, is that many apparent conflicts, upon careful examination, really amount to “false conflicts” to which only one law
sensibly applies.111 Courts determine whether there is a false
conflict by considering the purpose of each state’s substantive
law and asking whether the legislature would have wished to
regulate the party, transaction, or occurrence. The process of
deciding whether there is a false conflict hence involves ascertaining the scope of the substantive law of each potentially interested jurisdiction—a determination that necessarily is subject sensitive rather than transsubstantive.
Thus, if the modern conflicts approach of first eliminating
“false” conflicts is indeed a genuine contribution, it follows that
efficacious choice-of-law doctrines invariably are an aspect of
substantive law and that searching for transsubstantive choiceof-law principles is hopeless. If so, Congress must have the
power under the Effects Clause to generate subject-matterspecific choice-of-law rules. Conversely, a limitation of the sort
put forward by Tribe and Cox, under which Congress cannot
make subject-matter-sensitive choice-of-law rules, would doom
to failure any congressional enactments to create sensible
choice-of-law rules under the Effects Clause.

111. Interest analysis forthrightly inquires as to whether there is a true or
false conflict: “many courts that claim to follow the Second Restatement’s
‘most significant relationship’ test . . . apply it in a way that is indistinguishable from straightforward interest analysis,” and “other modern approaches
all build on” interest analysis. DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMAN HILL KAY, & LARRY
KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 132 (6th ed.
2001). It is with respect to how “true conflicts” are to be handled that the modern approaches diverge. See generally id. at 168–98 (discussing “true conflicts”). It is only the traditional choice-of-law approach, which a minority of
scholars and fewer than twenty percent of the states champion, that rejects
interest analysis’s “false conflicts” approach. See Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52
AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 26–27 (2004).
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C. CLAIMS THAT DOMA IS INCONSISTENT WITH SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
Virtually all DOMA critics share the assumption that
DOMA purports to authorize states to give less faith and credit
to sister-state judgments than Supreme Court precedent requires.112 From this, the argument goes, DOMA is unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the final say in determining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires.113 Part
III of the Article takes issue with the view that the Court’s
views of full faith and credit trump Congress’s. This subsection
undermines the critics’ assumption that DOMA’s rule is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
It is true that the Supreme Court’s full faith and credit jurisprudence almost always requires that states enforce sisterstate judgments. It is also true that the Court recently stated
that there is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith
and credit due judgments.”114 Against this background, the critics’ assumption that DOMA is inconsistent with the Court’s
precedent may seem irrefutable. There are two reasons, however, to understand DOMA’s rule with regarding judgments as
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. First, DOMA shares
important characteristics with the small class of judgments
that the Supreme Court does not require states to enforce,
namely, judgments that constitute improper extraterritorial
regulation by the issuing state. Second, even if DOMA is a public policy rule rather than an antiextraterritoriality rule, it creates a public policy exception that operates differently in crucial ways from those the Court has rejected. The next two
subsections address each of these reasons seriatim.
1. An Antiextraterritoriality Rule
The judgments that DOMA addresses share important
characteristics with the small class of sister-state judgments
112. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 4, at 15–16; see also Kramer, supra
note 4, at 2000 (“Existing law does not . . . allow one state to refuse recognition
to the final judgment of another state’s courts.”); Sack, supra note 104, at 888.
113. See Sack, supra note 104, at 895–96.
114. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); see also id. at
234 (“We are ‘aware of [no] considerations of local policy or law which could
rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which the full faith and credit
clause and the Act of Congress require to be given to [a money] judgment outside the state of its rendition.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943))).
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the Supreme Court does not require states to enforce. The
Court repeatedly has held that judgments that constitute improper efforts by the issuing state to regulate extraterritorially
exceed the issuing state’s regulatory jurisdiction and need not
be enforced.115 Thus, when the Court held that a Michigan
judgment preventing a Mr. Elwell from testifying against General Motors did not preclude a Missouri court from allowing Mr.
Elwell to testify, the Court explained that “Michigan’s power
does not reach into a Missouri courtroom to displace the forum’s own determination whether to admit or exclude evidence.”116 When the Supreme Court ruled that a court in one
state cannot issue a decree that transfers title to property that
is located in another state, it explained that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause “does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of
one State to property situated in another.”117 Judgments based
115. It is worth noting that extraterritorial regulation by states is not per
se invalid. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity
in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 919–30 (2002).
116. Baker, 522 U.S. at 240; see also id. at 238 (stating that Michigan’s
judgment cannot “control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions
brought by strangers to the [issuing state’s] litigation, from determining for
themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth”).
117. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 12 (1909). As my colleague Laura Cooper
has reminded me, the language in Fall that appears to erect an impermeable
barrier protecting the property situated in one state from judicial interference
by other states has been undermined by the Court’s “refus[al] to recognize an
exception to the rule of jurisdictional finality for cases involving real property
over which the State claims exclusive jurisdiction.” Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 705
n.11 (1982). By refusing to permit the second court to challenge the first
court’s jurisdictional determination in such cases, the doctrine permits an outcome where a court in state B must enforce a judgment from a court in state A
with respect to property Z, despite the fact that state B claims exclusive jurisdiction over property Z.
There are two reasons why Underwriters nonetheless does not undermine
the proposition that the Court has conceptualized as an antiextraterritorial
rule the doctrine that a judgment from state A purporting to transfer title to
real property in state B need not be enforced by courts in state B. First, even
after Underwriters, the Supreme Court has continued to explain Fall as an
antiextraterritoriality decision: in 1998 the Court explained Fall as a decision
in which an
[o]rder[ ] commanding action or inaction [was] denied enforcement in
a sister State when [it] purported to accomplish an official act within
the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation
over which the ordering State had no authority. Thus, a sister State’s
decree concerning land ownership in another State has been held ineffective to transfer title, see Fall v. Eastin . . . .
Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (first emphasis added, second emphasis omitted).
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on penal or tax laws also do not have to be enforced. The Court
has characterized such laws as exceptions to its ordinary full
faith and credit jurisprudence and has explained these exceptions in similar antiextraterritorial terms.118 Finally, the SuSecond, Underwriters at most means that the antiextraterritoriality rule
is not categorical, and the proposition above in text that Fall has been understood as an antiextraterritorial rule does not depend on its being a categorical
rule. Indeed, the fact that the antiextraterritorial rule is not categorical should
not be surprising because virtually all constitutional principles are noncategorical; for instance, the fact that Congress is sometimes permitted to regulate
speech (i.e., when there is a compelling interest and the regulation is narrowly
tailored) does not mean that there does not exist a constitutional principle of
free speech. See Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST.
LOUIS L.J. 691, 706 (2005). Moreover, considerations of finality of the sort
found in Underwriters have been held to override threshold jurisdictional
flaws in other contexts. For example, notwithstanding the strong principle
that a federal court must dismiss an action if it becomes apparent that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), the Supreme Court refused to vacate a final judgment where the federal court had mistakenly
granted a motion to remand (there was an absence of full diversity at the time
the motion to remand was granted) and where the defendant would have been
unable to subsequently remove the case on account of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)’s
one-year rule had the federal court correctly ruled on the initial motion to remand. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 64 (1996). Rather, once the case
had been tried in federal court, “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy bec[a]me overwhelming.” Id. at 75. The Caterpillar decision does not negate the strong principle that federal courts cannot hear matters over which
they lack subject-matter jurisdiction, but it shows that considerations of finality sometimes can override very strong jurisdictional principles.
In short, although the precise limitations on state extraterritorial powers
are more complex to identify after Underwriters insofar as the extraterritorial
rule is noncategorical, it remains true that Supreme Court doctrine recognizes
limits on state courts’ powers in relation to orders that purport to transfer title
in other states, and that the Court continues to conceptualize these limits as
an antiextraterritoriality rule.
It may be the case that Fall is best understood as an application of the
general rule that enforcement mechanisms do not travel with judgments to
sister states under the hoary precedent of McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen,
38 U.S. 312, 325 (1839). The fact that Fall itself cited to McElmoyle supports
this approach. See Fall, 215 U.S. at 12. Conceptualizing Fall as an application
of McElmoyle would not undermine my argument in text, however, for McElmoyle understood its holding as an antiextraterritoriality rule. See McElmoyle,
38 U.S. at 326, 327 (holding that a sister state’s judgment is “put upon the
footing of a domestic judgment; by which is meant, not having the operation
and force of a domestic judgment beyond the jurisdiction declaring it to be a
judgment, but a domestic judgment as to the merits of the claim, or subjectmatter of the suit” and explaining that “the Constitution did not mean to confer a new power of jurisdiction” (emphasis added)).
118. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (“Laws have
no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them,
and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States. . . .
Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local, . . . and
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preme Court has approvingly noted that state courts typically
do not enforce antisuit injunctions from other state courts, for
“hold[ing] otherwise ‘would mean in effect that the courts of one
state can control what goes on in the courts of another.’”119 In
short, the Court has deemed wrongful exterritorial regulation
the common ground shared by judgments and miscellaneous
state orders that need not be enforced by a sister state.
As the House Report on DOMA clarifies, the drafters designed DOMA’s judgments provision to combat the same issue
of problematic extraterritorial regulation.120 Congress enacted
DOMA when it appeared that Hawaii was to become the first
state to marry gay couples.121 Some gay rights advocates argued that gay couples married in Hawaii should request that a
Hawaii court authenticate the marriage with a declaratory
judgment.122 Many believed that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause would have required other states to respect such declaratory judgments.123 The House Committee report on DOMA
the authorities, legislative, executive or judicial, of other States take no action
with regard to [crimes and offenses]”(internal quotation omitted)) (describing
the penal law exception); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881)
(“No state can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction”) (describing the tax law exception). For a recent case discussing penal judgments, see
Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (observing that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause “does not require that sister States enforce a foreign penal
judgment”).
119. Baker, 522 U.S. at 236 n.9 (quoting Willis L. Reese, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 198 (1957)). Though the
Supreme Court stated that it “has not yet ruled” on the question of whether
antisuit injunctions must be enforced, it has spoken approvingly of the practice in dictum. See id. In fact, it is plausible that the Court’s approval of the
current state courts’ practice, which, “in the main, regard[s] antisuit injunctions as outside the Full Faith and Credit ambit,” was a component of the
Court’s holding in the Baker case. See id.
120. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–10 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906–14.
121. Id.
122. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 17.
123. See sources cited in id. at 17 & n.87. A reader of a draft of this Article
suggested to me that DOMA was unnecessary because such declaratory judgments are not enforceable against nonparties. Even if this were true, DOMA’s
rule still would be of use were the parties to divorce; a jurisdiction opposed to
same-sex marriage need not enforce judgments in connection with the dissolution of such a union. See infra Part IV. Moreover, although judgments generally do not have res judicata effects against a party who did not participate in
the prior adjudication, see Baker, 522 U.S. at 237 n.11; Koppleman, supra note
4, at 17 & n.90, court judgments concerning a person’s status (e.g., nationality,
paternity) typically apply to nonparties.
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cited these writers and stated that “it is possible that homosexual couples could obtain a judicial judgment memorializing
their ‘marriage,’ and then proceed to base their claim of sisterstate recognition on that judicial record.”124
The suggested strategy—that travelers to Hawaii obtain a
declaratory judgment—was designed to circumvent the ordinary American rule that the state of residence has virtually exclusive regulatory power over family law matters.125 Thus, this
strategy constituted an effort to extend Hawaii’s legislative juProfessor Koppelman similarly has argued that the concern about declaratory judgments was not legitimate because “the only kind of proceeding[ ]
that can generate a judgment entitled to full faith and credit” is a “genuinely
adversarial proceeding.” Id. This is not wholly correct, for the full faith and
credit doctrine contains loopholes pursuant to which sister states may be required to enforce collusive judgments. In the context of divorce proceedings,
for example, couples who wish to avail themselves of more liberal divorce laws
than those provided by their home states can travel to the state whose laws
they wish apply to their marriage, live there for the minimum time needed to
statutorily qualify as domiciled residents, have one of the parties perfunctorily
raise the issue of domicile in their divorce proceeding, and walk out of court
with a divorce judgment that their home state is bound to recognize. See
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 361–62 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Currie, supra note 61, at 10. In short, the Full Faith and Credit Clause jurisprudence does not prevent conniving parties from creating collusive judgments, and DOMA was an effort to close this type of loophole.
124. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 30.
125. When the family unit resides in the same state, then the state of residence has the legislative jurisdiction to regulate virtually all family matters;
conversely, nonresident states lack such regulatory powers. Complications
arise when the family unit is spread among two or more states, as is the case
when a divorcee moves out of state. The state of residence’s exclusive regulatory jurisdiction is true across the spectrum of family law matters. For instance, a state in which neither spouse resides cannot issue a divorce decree
that binds the state of residence. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 239 (1945). Similarly, under federal law, a child’s home state presumptively has the power to make custody and visitation determinations, and the
presumption is overridden only if the child has been abandoned or in an
“emergency” situation where “the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has
been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A), (C) (2000). Finally, a state in which neither the parent nor
child resides cannot alter a valid child support order issued by the state in
which the child or at least one of the parents resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e)
(2000).
To anticipate a possible objection, it cannot be said that the “place of celebration rule” is contrary to the proposition that the state of residence has virtually exclusive regulatory power over family matters. See Koppelman, supra
note 4, at 10 (discussing the “place of celebration rule”). While it is true that
the “place of celebration rule” provides that marriages are deemed valid by a
home state if the marriage was legal in the state of celebration, this rule is,
after all, the law of the home state and is subject to override if the marriage is
deemed to violate the home state’s public policy. See id.
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risdiction over matters that the home states more appropriately
have the power to regulate under well-established American
law. DOMA’s judgments provision sought to limit illicit extraterritorial regulation. As such, one could plausibly argue that
DOMA’s instruction that such judgments need not be enforced
by sister states is consistent with Supreme Court case law finding judgments reflecting illicit extraterritorial regulations outside the ambit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.126
2. DOMA as a Public Policy Exception
Even if DOMA is a public policy exception, there are two
important distinctions between DOMA and the instances where
the Court has rejected invocations of the public policy exception.
First, in all cases where the Court rejected the invocation
of public policy to avoid the enforcement of judgments, it has
been the efforts of state officials that were rebuffed.127 DOMA is
different in this regard because it is a decision by Congress, a
distinction that may well matter. The Court has explained its
rejection of state invocations of the public policy exception on
the basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s goal of “‘transforming an aggregation of independent sovereign States into a
nation.’”128 Permitting each state to invoke the public policy exception as it wishes would have a greater centrifugal force on
the Union than allowing Congress to identify discrete circumstances under which states may do so. After all, state officials
are responsible for advancing the interests of their states and
are not expected to think more broadly about national interests, whereas we expect Congress to act with the national interest in mind. Structurally, whereas states cannot be expected
to account for the externalities they impose on other states (by
refusing to apply nonforum law, for instance), Congress com126. To be sure, DOMA’s language does not apply only to declaratory
judgments but instead is broad enough to encompass judgments that do not
reflect problematic extraterritorial regulation. In my view, however, DOMA
should be construed in a narrow manner that does not embrace such judgments. See infra Part III.D.1.
127. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948); Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943), overruled by Thomas v. Wash. Gas
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908)
(holding that the judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and
credit in Mississippi despite the fact that the Missouri judgment rested on an
erroneous application of Mississippi law).
128. Baker, 522 U.S. at 234 (quoting Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 355).
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prises all interested parties and therefore is more likely to take
account of all costs that a given rule imposes on states. These
very considerations can explain why the dormant Commerce
Clause’s prohibition against the enactment of protectionist legislation extends to the states but not to Congress.129 Thus,
while it is eminently sensible that we would not want to leave
the job of “transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation”130 to the states, the same cannot be
said about relying on Congress to aid in creating the Union and
determining the appropriate degree of autonomy to be retained
by the states.
A second distinction between DOMA and the Court’s public
policy jurisprudence is that case law has rejected the existence
of a “ubiquitous” or “roving” public policy exception.131 To the
extent DOMA is conceptualized in public policy terms, DOMA
announces a tightly confined exception, restricted to judgments
in connection with same-sex marriage. A limited public policy
exception is less threatening to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause’s goal of creating a union than a “ubiquitous” exception.
This is suggested by the fact that although case law long has
explained why the enforcement of sister-state judgments is particularly crucial for the creation and maintenance of our country’s union,132 there nonetheless are several discrete types of
judgments that need not be enforced.133
In short, because DOMA is a congressionally created discrete exception to the general obligation to enforce sister-state
judgments, it is plausible to conclude that DOMA does not alter
any preexisting judicially created full faith and credit rules.
D. ASSERTIONS OF SUPREME COURT SUPREMACY
Professor Tribe calls DOMA unconstitutional because the
Effects Clause does not authorize Congress to determine that
certain acts or judgments need have no effect. Dean Kramer
and Professors Koppelman and Sack each assert that DOMA
exceeds Congress’s power because it seeks to “dilute” full faith
129. See Rosen, supra note 97, at 1573.
130. Baker, 522 U.S. at 234.
131. Id. at 233–34.
132. See, e.g., id. at 233 (noting that the “Full Faith and Credit Clause ‘ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the
Constitution, designed, demanded it’” (quoting Estin, 334 U.S. at 546)).
133. See supra Part II.C.1.
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and credit’s requirements. This subsection shows that the “no
effect” and “dilution” arguments amount to the same unargued
claim that the Supreme Court has the primary and last word in
respect of determining full faith and credit’s requirements. Part
III of the Article forthrightly considers each branch’s role with
regard to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, rejecting the unspoken assumption of Supreme Court supremacy that underwrites Kramer’s, Koppleman’s, and Sack’s apparently disparate
arguments.
1. No Effect is Not an “Effect”
Professor Tribe argues that the Effects Clause cannot be
read to authorize Congress to “licens[e] States to give no effect
at all to a specific category of ‘Acts, Records and Proceedings.’”134 According to Tribe, construing “prescribe . . . the Effect”135 to include the power to declare that no effect need be
given is “a play on words, not a legal argument.”136 Rather,
it is as plain as words can make it [that] the congressional power to
“prescribe . . . the effect” of sister-state acts, records, and proceedings,
within the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, includes no
congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records and proceedings that would otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause as judicially interpreted shall instead be
entitled to no faith or credit at all!137

To begin, Tribe’s construction of the word “effect” is not self
evident. Precisely why can’t the power to “prescribe . . . the Effect” include the power to say that something has no effect?138
Tribe does not suggest that such a construction violates linguistic conventions (as indeed it does not), but justifies his conclusion on the basis of the “context of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.”139 He asserts that those who advocate that Congress
has the power to determine that a public act or judgment is entitled to no faith or credit would confer on Congress a “sort of
134. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932.
135. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
136. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932.
137. Id.
138. For similar arguments, see The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S.
1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 58 (1996) [hereinafter
Hearing Letter] (letter from Michael W. McConnell, Professor, University of
Chicago Law School, to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (July 10, 1996)); Daniel A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the “Effects Clause” of Article IV, Section I and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 313 (1998).
139. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932.
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nullification authority,” that is, a “congressional license to ignore the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”140 The Effects Clause,
concludes Tribe, “simply will not bear so tortured a reading.”141
Careful examination discloses, however, that Tribe’s argument is not really a textual argument about the meaning of “effect” nor an argument about the nature of full faith and credit.
Instead, he makes an implicit claim that only one governmental institution—the courts—authoritatively determine what full
faith and credit requires.142 After all, while Tribe states that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s first sentence is a “selfexecuting requirement,”143 he does not criticize the many Supreme Court cases identifying public acts (and sometimes even
judgments) that need not be given effect by sister states. Consider, for example, Pacific Employers, in which the Court held
that California courts need not apply Massachusetts’s workmen’s compensation law. Under Tribe’s logic, Pacific Employers’s conclusion that California need not give effect to the Massachusetts law would be a “play on words, not a legal
argument” insofar as the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “selfexecuting”144 first sentence provides that “Full Faith and Credit
shall be given . . . to the . . . public Acts”145 of other states.
There are many other cases where the Court has ruled that the
forum need not apply the law of the nonforum state.146 Unless
Tribe is willing to reject all cases where the Court held that
acts and judgments of sister states need not be enforced, it
must be the case that he understands that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause’s “self-executing” requirement does not mean
that all the public acts of sister states must be given effect in
the forum state. Some need not be.
The important question then becomes which institution determines what acts and judgments fall under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause’s requirement. Built into Tribe’s argument is
the unargued conclusion that it is the Supreme Court alone
that has this power. Reread his argument:

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
146. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412 (1955); Alaska Packers
Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–48 (1935); Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
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it is as plain as words can make it [that] the congressional power to
‘prescribe . . . the effect’ of sister-state acts, records, and proceedings,
within the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, includes no
congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records and proceedings that would otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause as judicially interpreted shall instead be
entitled to no faith or credit at all!147

The crucial language in Tribe’s assertion is “as judicially
interpreted,” which suggests that Congress lacks the power to
decide that acts entitled to full faith and credit “as judicially interpreted” shall not be given effect. The phrase rescues Tribe’s
argument from indicting as wrongly decided all of the Court’s
holdings identifying acts and judgments that need not be given
effect. At the same time, this language proves that Tribe’s argument is not really a text-based claim that the power to prescribe effects cannot include the power to decide that an act
shall have no effect. Instead, Tribe’s argument boils down to
the unargued assertion that only the Supreme Court has the
power to say that a state can give no effect to an act or judgment. Unfortunately, Tribe does not justify what turns out to
be his unspoken major premise concerning judicial supremacy
in the determination of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires.
2. Dilution
Another critique several commentators level is that DOMA
exceeded Congress’s powers under the Effects Clause because
DOMA dilutes the quantum of credit that the Supreme Court
determined is required. The no-dilution constraint can be
traced to Justice Stevens’s 1980 plurality opinion in Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co., which indicated in dicta that “there
is at least some question whether Congress may cut back on
the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this
Court.”148 Dean Kramer provides a possible textual basis for
147. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932.
148. 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980) (plurality opinion). The plurality’s comments are dictum because the Thomas case did not analyze the scope of a congressional enactment under the Effects Clause but instead concerned the
question of whether one state must give res judicata effect to a workmen’s
compensation claim issued by another state’s administrative agency. Id. at
286.
The Thomas plurality opinion also opined that “Congress clearly has the
power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to
the laws or judgments of another State.” Id. at 273 n.18. Though beyond the
scope of this Article, I believe there are strong reasons to question this conclu-
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the view that Congress does not have the power to reduce the
credit that the Supreme Court indicated must be given to a
public act, judicial proceeding, or record. Kramer notes that the
Clause’s first sentence provides that “full faith and credit shall
be given.”149 He argues that “[t]his unqualified ‘full’ and mandatory ‘shall’ lose some (though obviously not all) of their meaning if Congress can simply legislate the requirement away or
relieve states of whatever obligations the Full Faith and Credit
Clause imposes.”150 From this, Kramer concludes that
it is more credible to read the Full Faith and Credit Clause as imposing a mandatory requirement of faith and credit (defined by the Supreme Court), with the Effects Clause authorizing Congress to enact
whatever national legislation is needed to refine and implement it.
Refine and implement, not undermine or abolish—which means that
even federal legislation must be tested against, and shown to be consistent with, the core requirements of full faith and credit.151

This interpretation of the Effects Clause is one of the predicates for Kramer’s conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional.152
To begin, the dilution argument fails if DOMA’s rules are
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, as I argued above.153
Beyond this, careful analysis shows that the no-dilution-power
theory collapses into the unargued conclusion that the Supreme
Court appropriately determines what the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires. Kramer’s dilution argument, like Tribe’s “no
effects” position, on closer examination turns out to be an unargued claim for judicial supremacy. To see this, let us reformulate Kramer’s question by substituting “the Supreme Court” for
“Congress” and ask whether the “unqualified ‘full’ and mandatory ‘shall’ lose some . . . of their meaning” if the Supreme Court
can simply interpret “away or relieve states of whatever obligations the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes.” If Kramer is
correct that the requirement that “full” faith and credit “shall
be given” means that all acts and judgments from sister states
must be given full effect, then all of the Court’s decisions identifying some acts or judgments that need not be given effect in
sister states cause the Full Faith and Credit Clause to “lose
some” of its meaning in the same way that DOMA purportedly
sion. For one argument, see Sack, supra note 104, at 893–95.
149. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 2003.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2007–08.
153. See supra Part II.C.
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does. Kramer, however, has not rejected as wrongly decided all
cases in which the Supreme Court determined that particular
acts or judgments need not be given effect in sister states. If the
critique Kramer levels does not apply to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Pacific Employers (for instance), then that is only
because Kramer assumes that the Court properly undertakes
the role of authoritatively interpreting the obligations that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes.154
The assumption concerning judicial supremacy in determining the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s requirements underlies the dilution analysis other scholars also
provide.155 This is not surprising because the concept of dilution
necessarily presumes the existence of a baseline. None of the
advocates of the “dilution” constraint on Congress’s powers
suggests that all acts, judgments, and records must be given
154. Dean Kramer does not provide a full-blown account of why the Supreme Court properly assumes this hegemonic function in the interpretation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In his more recent scholarship, however,
Kramer advances the view that societal actors apart from the Supreme Court,
including Congress, play important roles in authoritatively determining what
the Constitution means. See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 233–48. Thus, it is
possible that Kramer’s views regarding Congress’s role in interpreting what
the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires have shifted.
155. For example, Professor Koppelman argues that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause’s first sentence is a “clear, self-executing command” and that
the Effects Clause “should not be read in a way that contradicts the first. The
grant of power is thus limited by its context: Congress may not exercise its Effects Clause powers in a way that contradicts the self-executing command.”
Koppelman, supra note 4, at 20–21. Unless Koppelman dismisses as wrongly
decided all Supreme Court decisions holding that a forum need not apply the
acts and judgments of sister states—and there is no evidence that this is what
Koppelman thinks—his critique assumes that the Supreme Court has the
power to define the minimum full faith and credit baselines. Similarly, Professor Sack argues that “[t]he strongest argument for opponents of DOMA” is
that “Congress did not have the power to diminish the Constitution’s Full
Faith and Credit requirements with legislation such as DOMA.” Sack, supra
note 104, at 891–92; see also id. at 895 (“The history and purpose of the [Full
Faith and Credit] Clause provide convincing evidence that Congress cannot
dilute the Full Faith and Credit mandates of the Constitution.”). Professor
Sack’s formulation implicitly equates the Court’s full faith and credit doctrine
with “the Constitutional Full Faith and Credit requirements.” Id. at 891–92.
Professor Singer’s critique of DOMA likewise treats Supreme Court case law
as being metonymic with the constitutional protection of full faith and credit.
See Singer, supra note 7, at 44 (relying on a Supreme Court case for the proposition that “[b]efore the federal DOMA, it was fixed constitutional law that
states must enforce the final judgments of other states even if those judgments
violate the forum’s strong public policy” and concluding that “[t]o allow Congress to reverse this principle is to allow a statute to repeal part of the Constitution”).
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effect by sister states or that the many Supreme Court cases
that did not require forum states to give effect to the laws of
sister states were wrongly decided.156 The notion that the Effects Clause does not permit Congress to “dilute” the requirements of full faith and credit accordingly is inseparable from
the assumption that the Supreme Court alone appropriately
determines the baseline Full Faith and Credit Clause requirements that may not be congressionally diminished. Below, I
identify the various governmental institutions that properly
play a role in determining this baseline.157
III. CONGRESS’S POWER TO ENACT DOMA:
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLES OF CONGRESS, THE
PRESIDENT, AND THE COURTS IN DETERMINING WHAT
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT REQUIRES
Even if DOMA authorized states to refuse to enforce judgments that Supreme Court precedent indicated had to be enforced, it would not ineluctably follow that DOMA is unconstitutional. DOMA’s constitutionality would turn on Congress’s
and the President’s roles in determining what full faith and
credit requires. Moreover, as shown above, many of the arguments propounded by DOMA critics are premised on the unstated conclusion that the Supreme Court appropriately has
the final word in determining full faith and credit’s requirements.158 This Part of the Article accordingly considers the role
that governmental actors apart from the Supreme Court should
play in determining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires. Section A sketches the two approaches that scholars
and congresspersons to date have taken to this question. Laying them side-by-side suggests that there is an intermediate
path. Sections B and C identify and defend this middle path, an
156. See supra note 155.
157. See infra Part III.B.
158. This assumption underwrites the criticism of DOMA propounded by
Professor Tribe that the constitutional grant of the power to declare the “Effect thereof ” cannot include the power to determine that some acts or judicial
proceedings need not be given effect. See Tribe letter, supra note 63, at S5932;
supra Part II.D.1. Similarly, arguments that Congress does not have the
power to dilute the requirements of full faith and credit (including those by
Dean Kramer, see Kramer, supra note 4, at 2003, Professor Koppelman, see
Koppelman, supra note 4, at 20–21, and Professor Sack, see Sack, supra note
104, at 895) implicitly assume that the Supreme Court is responsible for determining the baseline requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See
supra Part II.D.2.
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approach under which Congress and the President have broad
powers under the Effects Clause, including the power to prescribe choice-of-law rules that differ from those identified by
the Supreme Court. Sections B and C also explain the important role courts continue to have in developing full faith and
credit doctrine. Section D applies the principles developed in
Sections B and C to DOMA.
A. APPROACHES ALREADY TAKEN
Scholars’ and politicians’ approaches to determining the
scope of Congress’s Effects Clause powers can usefully be divided into two general groups.159 The first reflects the view that
Congress is the ultimate arbiter of what effect need be given to
the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of sister states. Call
this the “Congressional Supremacy” approach. During floor debate of DOMA, for example, Senator Gramm argued that one
“need only read the second sentence of article IV, section 1 of
the Constitution to see that Congress has the only role in prescribing the circumstance under which one State must recognize a marriage that occurs in another State.”160 In a letter to
Senator Hatch during DOMA’s debate, Professor (now Judge)
Michael McConnell similarly argued that the Effects Clause
“does not give Congress power to make laws necessary and
proper for the ‘enforcement’ of state laws in other states, or for
carrying those laws into ‘execution.’ Instead, Congress is given
full power to ‘prescribe’ their ‘effect.’”161
To “prescribe the effect” of something is to determine what effect it
will have. In the absence of powerful evidence to the contrary, the
natural meaning of these words is that Congress can prescribe that a
particular class of acts will have no effect at all, or that their effect
will be confined to their state of origin.162

Proponents of this approach view Congress’s plenary power
as “encompassing both expansion and contraction” of effect that
a forum must give to another state’s acts or judgments under
159. Professor Douglas Laycock has offered an approach to the Effects
Clause that does not fit into either of these categories and with which I largely
concur. See Laycock, supra note 96, at 301–33, discussed infra Part III.C.4.a.
160. 142 CONG. REC. S10106 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Gramm) (emphasis added); see also id. at S10116 (statement of Sen. Burns)
(referring to the Effects Clause and stating that “the Framers of the Constitution had the foresight to give Congress the discretion to create exceptions to
the mandate contained in the Full Faith and Credit Clause”).
161. Hearing Letter, supra note 138, at 58.
162. Id. at 57.
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the case law.163 Though not completely clear, proponents of the
plenary power position appear to take the position that Congress’s determinations under the Effects Clause cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.164 Then-Professor McConnell, for
instance, wrote that Congress is “the ultimate umpire” in determining what effect one state’s laws, records, and judgments
have in another state.165 Similarly, as noted above, Senator
Gramm stated on the Senate floor that Congress has the “sole”
role in determining the extraterritorial effects of one state’s
acts, records, and judicial proceedings.166
The second approach conceptualizes a far more circumscribed congressional role in determining what the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires. Under this view, Congress has
power to legislate only with respect to matters about which the
Supreme Court has not provided a full faith and credit rule.
Call this the “Interstitial Power” approach.
There are three variants of the “Interstitial Power” approach. One group of scholars thinks that the Effects Clause
“authorizes Congress to enforce the clause’s self-executing requirements [only] insofar as judicial enforcement alone, as
overseen by the Supreme Court, might reasonably be deemed
insufficient.”167 A second position is that the Court’s holdings
determine the minimal amount of respect owed to sister-state
acts and judgments but that Congress can require more. Exemplary of this approach is Professor Cass Sunstein’s statement
before Congress during hearings for DOMA that Congress can
“expand[ ] the reach of state rules and judgments” as defined by
163. 142 CONG. REC. S10110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Byrd); see also Crane, supra note 138, at 315 (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit
Clause serves as a constitutional default provision in the absence of congressional legislation.”).
164. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 2002 (describing the plenary power position as the understanding that the full faith and credit rules identified by the
Court “have the status of federal common law and can thus be displaced by
Congress, which has nearly unlimited power under the Effects Clause to prescribe alternative rules”).
165. Hearing Letter, supra note 138, at 58. McConnell comes to this conclusion by arguing that there is no principled distinction between increasing
and diminishing the effect of a state’s law.
166. See 142 CONG. REC. S10106 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Gramm).
167. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932; see also Kramer, supra note 4,
at 2003 (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “impose[es] a mandatory requirement of faith and credit (defined by the Supreme Court), with the
Effects Clause authorizing Congress to enact whatever national legislation is
needed to refine and implement it”).
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the Court, but not diminish it.168 A third position denies Congress the power to expand the scope of what the Court has required. For instance, Senator Kennedy argued on the Senate
floor that “[t]he Constitution gives Congress no power to add or
subtract from the full faith and credit clause.”169 Similarly, Professor Sack argues that “Congress does not have plenary power
either to dilute or expand full faith and credit beyond what the
Court has delineated as the Constitution’s mandate” and that
Congress only has power to act in the areas “in which the Court
has not provided clear guidance or has explicitly refused to rule
on the requirements of the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit
Clause.”170 In short, what unites these three approaches is the
conception that Congress’s power under the Effects Clause is
limited by Supreme Court full faith and credit case law.
B. THE PATH NOT TAKEN: THE TEAMWORK MODEL
As different as they are, both the Congressional Supremacy
and Interstitial Powers approaches share something crucial in
common: both vest full responsibility for articulating full faith
and credit’s requirements in only one governmental institution.
Though closer in many respects to the Congressional Supremacy approach, the alternative I provide is more collaborative
than either Congressional Supremacy or Interstitial Powers. I
shall call it the “Teamwork” model. I hope to show here that the
Teamwork approach answers most objections that proponents
of the two contending groups identified above have hurled
against one another and accordingly is largely immune to the
criticisms that apply to Congressional Supremacy and Interstitial Powers. Finally, I will argue that the Teamwork model is
functionally sound and thus normatively attractive.
Here is a brief sketch of the Teamwork model, which I
shall elaborate and fully defend below. Under the Teamwork
approach, the Effects Clause’s charge that Congress may “prescribe . . . the effect”171 grants plenary power to the political
branches—meaning both Congress and the President172—to
168. See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 45 (1996) (prepared statement of Cass R.
Sunstein, Professor, University of Chicago Law School) (emphasis omitted).
169. 142 CONG. REC. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
170. Sack, supra note 104, at 832.
171. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
172. The President participates, of course, by means of the constitutional
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legislate and thereby determine what full faith and credit requires.173 This includes the power to decide that a particular
class of acts, judgments, or judicial proceedings need not be
given effect. Additionally, case law decided under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not diminish this power, but instead is usefully conceptualized as a form of federal common
law.174 Congress may accordingly disregard the full faith and
credit rules developed by courts, including the Supreme Court,
when exercising its powers under the Effects Clause. The Supreme Court nonetheless plays a significant role in reviewing
legislation enacted under the Effects Clause. This legislation
should be interpreted using a clear statement rule. Where legislation clearly addresses a particular subject matter, judicial
review should be deferential, asking only whether the legislation is a reasonable choice-of-law provision.
In short, as the term suggests, the Teamwork model posits
that determining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires is an undertaking that involves multiple institutions.
This is not to imply that all institutions have equivalent, or
even equally important, roles. The Teamwork model anticipates
that Congress appropriately plays the largest role in fleshing
out the requirements of full faith and credit. The other players’
participation (i.e., the President’s and the courts’) nevertheless
is essential for the enterprise to function properly.
C. TEXTUAL, PRECEDENTIAL, AND FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
This Section identifies textual, precedential, and functional
support for the Teamwork model. In the process, this Section
also anticipates and refutes challenges likely posed by Congressional Supremacists and Interstitialists to the Teamwork
model.

requirements of presentment and return. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 946–48 (1983) (describing the constitutional requirement of presentment).
173. This constitutes a rejection of the possibility that the Effects Clause’s
power to “prescribe” refers to nonlegislative powers that accordingly do not require presidential participation through presentment and are not subject to
veto.
174. As discussed below, one could make a plausible argument that Congress enjoys such powers even if the Court’s full faith and credit rulings are
considered constitutional law rather than federal common law. See infra Part
III.C.4.b.
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1. Text
Let us start with the text of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Read on its own, the Effects Clause seems to vest considerable powers in the national legislature when it states that
Congress has the power to “prescribe . . . the Effect” of acts, records, and judicial proceedings by means of “general” laws.175
Most scholarly works penned before passage of DOMA agreed
that the Effects Clause vested Congress with considerable regulatory authority.176
The Teamwork approach comfortably fits the Effects
Clause. The Clause makes it constitutionally mandatory that
one state give full faith and credit to other states’ acts, judicial
proceedings, and records, but authorizes Congress to “prescribe” the effects and thereby specify what full faith and credit
requires in various contexts. Such a construction is not internally contradictory as a textual matter because, as case law
long has recognized, it is implausible to suggest that full faith
and credit means that state A’s court inexorably must apply
state B’s law.177 If full faith and credit cannot plausibly mean
“apply the other state’s law all the time,” then some institution
must determine what full faith and credit does mean, and the
Clause’s second sentence explicitly identifies a congressional
role in that task. This is not to suggest that courts properly
play no role in fleshing out full faith and credit’s requirements.
Federal courts have the power to create rules in the absence of
congressional action, and, as will be discussed in greater detail
below, the power to review congressional acts under a deferential standard that ensures such statutes are reasonable. But, as
is the case with federal common law generally, any rules laid
175. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
176. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 96, at 301 (arguing that Congress’s Effects Clause powers are considerable, noting that “almost everyone agrees that
[this] includes power to specify choice-of-law rules,” and citing as examples of
those who agree, Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 425–26 (1919); Brainerd Currie,
Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 227, 266–67 (1958); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 23–28 (1991); and
Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A
Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 80 (1957)).
177. See Alaska Packer Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S.
532, 547 (1935) (“A rigid and literal enforcement of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd
result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.”).
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down by federal courts before Congress acts do not displace
congressional power.
Importantly, the textual argument provided here insulates
the Teamwork approach from a text-based critique to which the
Congressional Supremacy approach is vulnerable. Many Congressional Supremacists argue that the Effects Clause grants
Congress the power to make “exceptions” to what the Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires.178 Interstitialists understandably
ask how this position squares with the Effects Clause’s requirement that “full” faith and credit “shall” be given.179 The
Teamwork approach’s perspective on this debate is that the
Congressional Supremacists implicitly, and mistakenly, concede that courts alone are responsible for determining what full
faith and credit means. The better approach is to understand
the Effects Clause as authorizing Congress to play a role in determining what full faith and credit itself requires, not as
granting congressional power to make exceptions to what
Court-defined full faith and credit requires.
Interstitialists undoubtedly would argue that the Teamwork model, like the Congressional Supremacy model, undermines the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s requirement that
“Full Faith and Credit . . . shall be given.”180 Such Interstitialist
criticism is subject to three responses. First, the mere fact that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause utilizes unqualified, categorical language (“full,” “shall”) does not mean that it must give
rise to a categorical constitutional requirement. After all, other
categorical constitutional language has begotten noncategorical
constitutional requirements. For instance, notwithstanding the
First Amendment’s categorical declaration that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”181 Congress
178. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930 (“While full faith and credit is the rule—that is, while
States are generally obligated to treat laws of other States as they would their
own—Congress retains a discretionary power to carve out such exceptions as it
deems appropriate.” (emphasis added)); 142 CONG. REC. S10116 (daily ed.
Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Burns) (“[T]he Framers of the Constitution
had the foresight to give Congress the discretion to create exceptions to the
mandate contained in the ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause.’”); id. at S10110
(statement of Sen. Byrd) (“[I]t is not at all clear why a general empowering of
Congress to ‘prescribe . . . the effect’ of public acts does not give it discretion to
define the ‘effect’ so that a particular public act is not due full faith and
credit.” (emphasis added)).
179. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4, at 2002–03.
180. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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can prohibit political speech that occurs outside of polling
places,182 and states may ban certain hate speech.183 Similarly,
notwithstanding the First Amendment’s guaranty that government “shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of
religion,184 Congress may enact laws that criminalize activities
that are part of a religious community’s worship and accordingly hinder the religious community’s ability to freely practice
its religion.185 The fact that other constitutional provisions with
the categorical language of “shall” have not been construed to
generate categorical constitutional protections blunts Interstitialist criticisms that the Congressional Supremacist and
Teamwork models do not give categorically “full” credit to sister
states’ acts, records, and judicial proceedings.
Second, the Interstitialist position itself does violence to
the constitutional text. The Interstitialist claim that Congress’s
legislative power is what remains after the Supreme Court has
acted conflicts with the Clause’s apparently unconditional
grant to Congress of the power to “prescribe . . . the effect” of
acts, records, and judgments.186
Third, the Interstitialist approach condemns a long line of
Supreme Court precedent. Interstitialists who accept currently
decided Supreme Court case law that permits a forum to not
apply a sister-state act or judgment are vulnerable to the same
criticism they presumably would hurl at Teamwork model advocates (and that they already throw at Congressional Supremacists). This case law literally allows one state not to give
“full” faith and credit to another state’s public acts and judgments. To hold true to their strict textual approach, Interstitialists must denounce this entire line of precedent. All things
being equal, a construction of constitutional language that does
not suggest that more than a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence is wrongly decided is preferable to an interpretation
that does.
182. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
183. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (noting that “the First
Amendment permits content discrimination based on the very reasons why the
particular class of speech at issue . . . is proscribable” (citation omitted)).
184. U. S. CONST. amend. I.
185. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990) (upholding Oregon’s ban on peyote use against claims that its use was part of the
plaintiffs’ religious practices); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67
(1878) (upholding a congressional ban on polygamy against claims that it was
a religious practice).
186. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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For these three reasons, the Interstitialist position is less
compelling on textual grounds than the Teamwork model.
2. Precedent
DOMA is only the fifth congressional enactment pursuant
to the Effects Clause,187 and none of the previous four has been
constitutionally challenged on Effects Clause grounds. We consequently are without Supreme Court precedent as to the extent of Congress’s powers under that Clause.
On numerous occasions, however, the Court has indicated
in dicta that Congress has the power under the Effects Clause
to create full faith and credit rules that differ from those that
the Court itself has identified. In the relatively recent case of
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, for example, the Court decided that a
forum state that was constitutionally obligated to apply nonforum law nonetheless could apply the forum state’s statute of
limitations.188 The Court, per Justice Scalia, rejected the modern view that statutes of limitations are substantive, which
would have led to the conclusion that the nonforum state’s
statute of limitations had to be applied, and instead held that
the historical understanding that statutes of limitations are
procedural governed for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.189 The Court nonetheless went on to state that “[i]f current conditions render it desirable that forum States no longer
treat a particular issue as procedural for conflict of laws purposes . . . it can be proposed that Congress legislate to that ef-

187. The other statutes are the 1790 implementing statute directing that
“[a]cts, records and judicial proceedings . . . so authenticated, shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are
taken,” see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §1738 (2000)); an 1804 Act that provided a method for authenticating nonjudicial records, see Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298; the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, see Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6–10, 94
Stat. 3569 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1738A (2000)); the Full Faith
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, see Pub. L. No. 103-383, 104 Stat.
4064 (1994) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1738B (2000)); and the Violence Against Women Act’s full faith and credit provision, see Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40221, 108
Stat. 1930 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §2265 (2005)), which requires
sister states to recognize and enforce a valid protection order issued by another state. See generally Sack, supra note 104, at 876–77 (describing these
Acts).
188. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988).
189. See id. at 728–29.
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fect under the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.”190
Sun Oil’s dictum is inconsistent with those Interstitialists
who posit that Congress can legislate only with regard to matters that have not been addressed by the Court. The dictum
does not contradict Congressional Supremacists or the Teamwork approach, but nor does it fully support these approaches.
This is so because the type of legislation that the dictum invited would have required the forum state to give more effect to
sister-state law than the Sun Oil rule required: Sun Oil did not
require the forum to apply a sister state’s statute of limitations
but invited Congress to so mandate.191 The Sun Oil dictum accordingly does not provide any guidance with regard to the
question of whether Congress can authorize states to give less
effect to a sister state’s act or judgment than Supreme Court
precedent requires.
In fact, there are diverging views in Supreme Court opinions as to whether Congress can authorize the forum state to
give less credit to a foreign judgment than case law otherwise
provides. Justice Stone was of the view that Congress had such
powers, writing in dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough:
The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined
by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded
or contracted by Congress . . . . The constitutional provision giving
Congress power to prescribe the effect to be given to acts, records and
proceedings would have been quite unnecessary had it not been intended that Congress should have a latitude broader than that given
the courts by the full faith and credit clause alone.192
190. Id. at 729. This opinion was handed down before the Court decided
City of Boerne v. Flores, in which the Court determined that Congress’s powers
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment do not include the power to legislate in accordance with congressional understandings of the first four sections of the Fourteenth Amendment that differ from the Court’s interpretations. 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997). Boerne does not undermine the argument
here as to Congress’s powers under the Effects Clause for two reasons. First,
statutory nullification of the Supreme Court’s full faith and credit determinations may be best conceptualized as congressional displacement of federal common law rather than congressional reinterpretation of what full faith and
credit means as a matter of constitutional law. See infra text accompanying
notes 204–11. Second, even if the Court’s full faith and credit decisions are
viewed as articulating constitutional rules, the Boerne line of cases may be
distinguished: where the Constitution textually limits Congress’s powers to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, congressional powers under the Effects
Clause can more plausibly be considered plenary. See Hearing Letter, supra
note 138, at 58.
191. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 728–29.
192. 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, a plurality opinion in the 1980 case of
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. indicated in dicta that
“there is at least some question whether Congress may cut back
on the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this
Court.”193 In short, the Supreme Court has not yet provided
clear guidance, even in dicta, regarding the scope of congressional power under the Effects Clause.
3. Functionalist Considerations
The strongest justification for the Teamwork model’s rejection of judicial supremacy in the formulation of full faith and
credit’s requirements rests on functionalist considerations. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not aim to maximize one
value, but instead mediates among a set of incommensurable
considerations that sometimes conflict: nearly a century of case
law has made clear that the Clause aims not just to unify the
states, but to generate a federal system in which differences
among the subfederal polities are accommodated so that they
can remain meaningfully empowered, distinct political entities.194
How are the competing considerations of respecting states’
distinctiveness and unifying the country to be harmonized?
Careful thought suggests that there is no single a priori correct
way to do so; rather, determining how to harmonize these competing considerations is a highly subjective, identity-defining
activity. This is so because the competing considerations of preserving state autonomy and unifying the country are not reducible to a common metric and hence are incommensurable.
To fully understand this, it is necessary to refine the philosophical concept of incommensurability. When goods are commensurable, there are clear-cut choices among them with respect to which all rational actors would agree. For example, a
single five-dollar bill readily can be evaluated in relation to
193. 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980) (plurality). These comments are dictum
because Thomas did not analyze the scope of a congressional enactment under
the Effects Clause but instead concerned the question of whether one state
must give res judicata effect to a workmen’s compensation claim that had been
issued by another state’s administrative agency. See id. at 286. The plurality
opinion in Thomas also opined that “Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to the laws or
judgments of another State.” Id. at 273 n.18. Though beyond the scope of this
Article, I believe there are strong reasons to question this conclusion. For one
argument, see Sack, supra note 104, at 893–95.
194. See supra discussion at Part II.A.
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three one-dollar bills, and everyone would agree that, in the ordinary case,195 the former is more valuable than the latter.196
Incommensurability, by contrast, concerns the choice between
(or among) options that cannot be reduced to a single, allencompassing metric that permits comparisons with which all
rational agents would agree.197 Incommensurability accordingly
describes the arena of choice in which subjective evaluations
must be made. Choosing among incommensurables amounts to
a process of prioritizing competing commitments. As such, the
choice can well be understood as defining the very character of
the person or polity making the decision.198 In the context at
hand, how the full faith and credit doctrine harmonizes the
competing considerations of state autonomy and unifying the
nation is an important determinant of the very character of our
nation’s federal system.
The question then becomes what governmental institutions
are suited to making such determinations. Congress and the
President are the strongest candidates. Ruling out the alternatives clarifies why this is so. To begin, the states are not well
suited to making such determinations because they are not designed to take into account national interests; state governments, including state courts, are devised to look out for state
195. This excludes, for instance, a dollar bill that has been signed by a celebrity.
196. Cf. Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1412–15 (2001) (speaking of the
incontestable goal of “maximizing” when deciding among commensurable matters); see also id. at 1428–29 (“[I]f there is only one value that ultimately matters, then rationality will compel a practical decision maker to seek and choose
the option that will realize the most of that value. From this view, practical
reason is entirely a matter of calculation.”).
197. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110, 110 (Ruth
Chang ed., 1997) (“Incommensurability is the absence of a common measure.”);
Scharffs, supra note 196, at 1390–91 (stating that incommensurability arises
when “everything that matters about two competing options can[not] be expressed in terms of a common value”).
198. Other commentators have made similar accounts of incommensurability. See, e.g., Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 197, at 151, 151–69 (focusing on individual decision making under circumstances of incommensurability); Raz, supra note 197, at 110–28 (arguing
that choice, not rationality, governs the selection among incommensurables);
Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 197, at 170, 170–83 (arguing that justified
choice among incomparables can be made by analyzing how the competing
goods fit within the “shape” of a persons life).
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interests. These concerns give rise to the dormant Commerce
Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause doctrines that
limit the extent to which states can regulate in ways that affect
American citizens that are not citizens of the regulating
state.199 Because polities cannot be trusted to guard the interests of noncitizens—who have no political voice through voting—states cannot be trusted to make the extraterritoriality
determinations that lie at the heart of full faith and credit doctrine.
When choosing among the possible federal entities, Congress and the President are particularly well suited for determining how to harmonize the competing commitments of unifying while still maintaining meaningful differences among
subfederal polities. Most importantly, because harmonizing
incommensurable commitments is an intrinsically subjective
and identity-forming activity, decision making of this sort falls
more to the political branches of government than to the judiciary. Moreover, the legislative process, which involves congressional and presidential participation, is structured such that
both state and national interests are considered:200 congresspersons are elected on statewide or substate-wide bases rather
than a national basis yet are institutionally expected to consider the national interest. The President is elected by a constituency that is simultaneously nationwide and state-based.
By contrast, the process by which federal judges are selected
and the life tenure they enjoy does not suggest that they are
apt to give due consideration to both state and federal interests. Instead, by virtue of their identities as federal officials
and their predominantly federal case law, federal judges are
likely to systematically favor federal over state considerations.
This is not to suggest that federal courts have no role to
play in determining full faith and credit’s requirements—they
do. One of their most important roles was creating a century of
jurisprudence that has teased out the underlying principles
implicated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The intense
analysis of highly fact-specific circumstances frequently facili199. See generally Rosen, supra note 115, at 897–930 (reviewing constitutional provisions that limit state’s extraterritorial regulatory powers).
200. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 550–54 (1985) (discussing the composition of the federal government and
its effect on preserving states’ interests). Of course, to accept that Congress is
structured in a manner that takes account of states’ interests is not necessarily to conclude that there is no role for judicial oversight via the Tenth
Amendment. But see id. at 537–55.
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tates excavation of underlying principles; this is a large part of
the common-law system’s wisdom.
However, while courts are well suited to identifying underlying principles, it does not follow that they are best candidates
for determining how to fit the principles together. This is particularly true where the underlying principles both conflict and
are incommensurable.201 Foundational democratic principles
suggest that such highly subjective, identity-determining decisions are best made by the more political branches of government. This is particularly true for matters determining the
character of federalism insofar as the Congress and President
(as explained above) are more apt than the federal judiciary to
take account of both national and state interests. These considerations together suggest that there should be highly deferential judicial review of the political branches’ harmonization of
incommensurable commitments in the context of full faith and
credit doctrine.
Another constructive and institutionally appropriate role
federal courts can play in the context of determining full faith
and credit’s requirements is to adopt a standard of review that
ensures the more political branches have considered how to
harmonize the competing considerations. After all, it is sensible
for courts to defer to the political branches’ determinations with
regard to harmonizing incommensurables only if the political
branches have actually attempted to do so. A variation on a
clear statement rule, discussed in greater detail below,202 can
accomplish this. Indeed, the Court has adopted clear statement
requirements in several federalism contexts designed to make
certain that Congress forthrightly indicates its intention to exercise its unquestionable constitutional powers.203

201. Though judicial decision making not infrequently requires that courts
seek to harmonize incommensurable considerations, see generally Scharffs,
supra note 196, at 1374, that does not mean it is normatively desirable.
202. See infra Part III.D.1.
203. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–67 (1989)
(requiring a clear statement to compel states to entertain damages suits
against themselves in state courts); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (holding that abrogation of state sovereign immunity
must be expressed “in unmistakable language”). See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (noting
that the Court has created “a series of new ‘super-strong clear statement rules’
protecting constitutional structures, especially structures associated with federalism”).
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4. Objections to the Teamwork Model
This subsection anticipates and responds to an obvious objection to the Teamwork model: that it subverts the ordinary
system of judicial review under which the Supreme Court’s
constitutional interpretations are authoritative and final.
There are two plausible bases for the Teamwork model’s rejection of judicial supremacy in the context of determining full
faith and credit’s requirements. One basis relies on wellestablished doctrine. The second basis, wholly independent of
the first, is premised on a normative claim that is at variance
with some important contemporary doctrine.
a. Doctrinal Justification
The first response can be traced to Justice Stone’s dissent
in Yarborough v. Yarborough,204 for any judicial supremacy objection would apply equally to Justice Stone’s suggestion that
Congress may have the power to “expand[ ]” or “contract[]”
Court-determined requirements of full faith and credit205 as it
would to the Teamwork model. The justification he provided in
support of his conception of congressional power under the Effects Clause applies to the Teamwork model: there is constitutional text—the Effects Clause—that grants Congress the
power to determine the “effect” of acts, judgments, and judicial
proceedings.206
But how, one might ask, could a constitutional provision
authorize Congress to essentially overturn Supreme Court decisions? A deeper inquiry into the nature of any such congressional enactments and their relationship to preenactment judicial precedent answers this query, thereby confirming the
plausibility of Justice Stone’s text-based approach. That is to
say, what follows is not the primary normative justification for
the Teamwork approach. Rather, it is a demonstration that the
Teamwork approach is not sui generis in constitutional law but
instead can be assimilated to existing doctrine.
Let us begin by considering what status an enactment pursuant to the Effects Clause would have: would it be an ordinary
statute or a constitutional interpretation by Congress of what
full faith and credit requires? Careful thought suggests it
would be at least a statute and perhaps even a constitutional
204. 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
205. Id. at 215 n.2 (Stone, J., dissenting).
206. See id.
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interpretation. Both possibilities are consistent with American
constitutionalism.
Start by considering the possibility that a congressional
enactment would be a mere statute. It is easy enough to understand that the Effects Clause empowers Congress to enact
statutes that determine the effects of acts, proceedings, or
judgments. Less obvious is how a statute could effectively overrule a Supreme Court decision. The solution is straight forward: statutes would have power to displace Supreme Court
precedent if the court rulings constitute federal common law
rather than constitutional rulings.207 As Professor Douglas
Laycock argues,208 there is a well-established body of federal
common law—namely, the federal common law the Supreme
Court has fashioned to “resolve interstate disputes over
boundaries”—that is conceptually similar to the full faith and
credit doctrine.209 The underlying commonality is that both interstate border disputes and full faith and credit concern the
extent of one state’s authority vis-à-vis other states. Determining state borders is “in its nature a federal question” that Congress has the authority to decide,210 but “in default of legislation, the Court must create federal common law to resolve such
disputes.”211
The same reasoning applies to full faith and credit doctrine. Determining when one state must give effect to a sister
state’s law or judgment by its nature is a federal question because it turns on deciding the scope of each state’s regulatory
authority. Congress has the authority to make such determinations under the Effects Clause, and in the absence of congressional action, the Court must fashion rules. Any such court
rules, however, are subject to congressional revision. The same
give-and-take between Congress and the Court is found in the
dormant Commerce Clause context. The Court creates dormant

207. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1975).
208. Laycock, supra note 96, at 333.
209. Id. For an example of the Supreme Court’s application of this federal
common law, see Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295–97 (1918) (resolving a
boundary dispute involving the shifting of the Mississippi River). The Court
has continued to resolve such interstate disputes even after Erie. See, e.g.,
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 25–28 (1995) (resolving a border dispute
between Louisiana and Mississippi).
210. See Cissna, 246 U.S. at 295–96; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
211. Laycock, supra note 96, at 333.

ROSEN_3FMT

2006]

04/18/2006 03:28:45 PM

DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT

973

Commerce Clause doctrines in situations where Congress has
not exercised Commerce Clause power it unquestionably enjoys, and Congress can reverse the Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause rulings (by, for example, authorizing states to enact protectionist legislation) when it elects to exercise its Commerce
Clause powers.212
Next, consider the possibility that an enactment would
constitute an instance of congressional constitutional interpretation. There is nothing revolutionary about this possibility.213
Indeed, Congress’s role in interpreting the Constitution under
the Teamwork model is less expansive than Congress’s role under well-established doctrine dating back nearly two hundred
years, now known as the political question doctrine, under
which Congress is the final and authoritative interpreter of
several constitutional provisions.214 For instance, it is the Senate’s sole responsibility to determine what the constitutional
requirement of “try” means in the context of impeachment proceedings; courts have no power to even deferentially review the
Senate’s interpretation.215 One of the factors on which the Supreme Court has relied in deciding that the responsibility for
constitutional interpretation rests with a nonjudicial branch is
a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”216 The Effects Clause
seems to be no less explicit an indicator of congressional interpretive responsibility than are other provisions held to be the
interpretive responsibility of the nonjudicial branches.217 Thus,
conceptualizing congressional enactments under the Effects
Clause as instances of congressional constitutional interpreta212. See Monaghan, supra note 207, at 16–17.
213. For a similar argument to what follows, see Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise
of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 319–23 (2002) (noting the different roles Congress plays in proffering constitutional interpretations as well
as the “spectrum of deference to the political branches’ interpretation of the
Constitution”).
214. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–37 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–43 (1849) (holding that “it rests with Congress” to
determine the meaning of the Guaranty Clause).
215. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that the Senate
alone determines what the Impeachment Trial Clause requires).
216. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
217. See, e.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229–30 (holding that language in the U.S.
Constitution stating that the “Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments” is a “textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate
branch”).
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tion would not require Congress to play an unprecedented role.218
Moreover, the nonjudicial branches’ responsibilities for
constitutional interpretation under the Teamwork model are
less unusual than those found under the political question doctrine because courts still have important roles to play under the
Teamwork model. The Court is responsible for ensuring by a
clear statement rule that Congress and the President have
forthrightly considered how to harmonize the full faith and
credit doctrine’s competing considerations and applies deferential review to ensure that any Effects Clause statutes are not
unreasonable. In fact, congressional and presidential responsibilities under the Teamwork approach are not too different
from those circumstances in which the Court adopts deferential
judicial review of legislation.219 After all, ordinary legislation
proceeds after Congress has made a threshold determination
that it has the constitutional power to legislate. Deferential judicial review reflects the Court’s determination that it ought to
give a benefit of the doubt to Congress’s constitutional judgment as to its constitutional powers.220 Insofar as all legislation
proceeds from Congress’s interpretation of its own constitutional powers, the nonjudicial branches’ responsibilities in respect of constitutional interpretation under the Teamwork
model are not that different from the interpretive duties asso218. It is true that in these other political question contexts the Court not
only decides that a constitutional provision is the interpretive responsibility of
another branch of government but also determines that courts are without the
power to decide the question. See, e.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229–30. There is no
particular reason to think, however, that justiciability is a prerequisite for judicial responsibility in constitutional interpretation. Nonjusticiability is wise if
courts are institutionally incapable of crafting even an interim solution pending resolution by the branch ultimately responsible for providing the final and
authoritative interpretation. If circumstances are such that a default judicial
rule is better than no rule at all, why shouldn’t courts be permitted to act first
with the understanding that Congress thereafter may revise their judgments?
219. The extent to which the Court actually utilizes deferential review has
varied over time, and it appears that the Court has been tending to show less
deference to coordinate branches across wider expanses of constitutional doctrine. See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme
Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 79–87
(2003).
220. See id. at 85–87; see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135–36
(1893) (discussing judicial power in relation to legislative power); Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1007–08 (1924)
(quoting with approval the Thayerian view that Congress’s constitutional interpretations should be given great deference).
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ciated with run-of-the-mill legislation subject to only deferential review.221
To quickly conclude, Justice Stone’s view that the Effects
Clause may authorize Congress either to expand or contract the
full faith and credit duties identified by the Court would not
create an Effects Clause jurisprudence that is wholly sui
generis. Instead, it generates an approach to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause that is consistent with other constitutional doctrines. Effects Clause enactments plausibly could constitute either pure statutes or constitutional interpretations by Congress. Either type of enactment could displace the default rules
of full faith and credit created by the judiciary that have the
status of federal common law.
b. Normative Justification
Even if the Court’s full faith and credit cases announce
constitutional rules instead of federal common law, it would not
ineluctably follow that Congress and the President are without
the power to act on the basis of their own constitutional interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Rather, Congress
and the President lack the power act only if the Supreme
Court’s constitutional interpretations trump the nonjudicial
federal branches’ interpretations. Many scholars have rejected
this “judicial supremacy” conception, adopting instead the “departmentalist” conception that the judiciary enjoys no special
interpretive prerogative in constitutional interpretation.222 Under this approach, the other branches of government—
generally the federal government—may rely upon their own
understandings of the Constitution when they act.223
The anti-judicial-supremacy argument, however, runs

221. It might be objected that legislation under the Commerce Clause, for
example, is different because any constitutional interpretation by Congress
reflects only a judgment as to its own powers, whereas legislation under the
Effects Clause represents a judgment about the Constitution’s limitations on
other polities (i.e., the states). Any such distinction is untenable because Congress’s powers deprive other governmental entities of power by virtue of the
Tenth Amendment. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–56
(1992) (stating that “whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment” is a “mirror image[ ]” of the
question of “whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers
delegated to Congress in . . . the Constitution”).
222. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 106 (explaining the “departmental” theory).
223. Id.
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afoul of important contemporary case law. Although the wellknown 1966 opinion of Katzenbach v. Morgan224 most plausibly
is construed as a departmentalist approach within the context
of Congress’s Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment,225 more recent case law rejects this approach,226 asserting in its place strong judicial supremacy227 in the interpretation of constitutional law.228 To be sure, one could argue that
the Court only asserts judicial supremacy in the limited context
of Section 5, where Congress’s powers are nonplenary.229 As a
purely positive matter, however, the Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence seems to reflect the Court’s current general conception of
judicial review. Thus, any argument that Congress and the
President may act on the basis of their own constitutional interpretations constitutes a plea for doctrinal change rather
than an argument squarely based on contemporary precedent.
Even if Congress does not have the power to legislative on
the basis of its own constitutional interpretations, one could
still conclude that the Effects Clause explicitly gives Congress
interpretive powers coextensive with the Supreme Court in the
narrow context of full faith and credit. This argument does not
directly run up against contemporary precedent, but no case
law directly supports it, either. Instead, this argument is both
novel and wholly sui generis to the full faith and credit context.
For these reasons, the justification for Congress’s plenary Effects Clause powers provided above230 is a stronger argument
for the Teamwork model in view of contemporary precedent.

224. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
225. See id. at 656 (upholding a statute banning literacy requirements for
voting under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Katzenbach Court
explained that even though the Court had upheld literacy requirements
against an equal protection challenge in a recent case, Congress was free to
legislate on the basis of the contrary view that such requirements were unconstitutional and the Court would uphold Congress’s independent constitutional
assessment as long as the Court could “perceive a basis upon which Congress
might predicate [its] judgment.” Id. For present purposes, there is no need to
review the cottage industry of scholarly approaches to interpreting Katzenbach—which involved such distinctions as ratchet-up and ratchet-down interpretations—that arose following the decision’s publication.
226. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997).
227. See Waldron, supra note 34, at 197–98.
228. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535–36.
229. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 649–51 (explaining the standard for determining appropriate congressional legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
230. See supra Part III.C.3.
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D. ELABORATING THE TEAMWORK MODEL AND APPLYING IT TO
DOMA
Having generally described the Teamwork model and defended it against a powerful objection in the two preceding subsections, I will now elaborate the Teamwork model and apply it
to DOMA.
1. Elaboration
In the absence of federal legislation, both federal and state
courts231 can issue rulings on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause’s requirements. Any such rulings have the status of federal common law.232 In the event that Congress enacts legislation under the Effects Clause, courts should undertake a twopart analysis. First, courts should apply a clear statement rule
to check that Congress engaged in a decision-making process
that considered how full faith and credit’s competing considerations should be harmonized in the context in which the statute
is being applied. The italicized language merits elaboration.
The harmonization process that attends full faith and credit determinations invariably requires highly contextualized analysis
because the extent to which state autonomy and national unity
are implicated varies depending upon the substantive law or
judgment at issue.233 The type of judicial test I propose, designed to make certain that the political branches have forthrightly considered harmonizing the Full Faith and Credit
Clause’s competing considerations in the context at hand, is effectively a rule of statutory interpretation requiring context
specificity.
Because Congress faces difficulty anticipating and considering the full range of substantive contexts, this standard of review likely means that courts would have the first opportunity
to reconcile the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s competing principles, subject to congressional override. Though a bit clunky,
this institutional arrangement seems wise. Courts are well
suited to highly context-specific analysis that identifies the underlying principles that particular fact patterns raise; this, indeed, is the core of common-law adjudication. Courts are less
231. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal
Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 839–51 (2005) (illustrating state courts’
role in the formulation of federal common law).
232. See id.
233. See supra Part III.C.3.
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institutionally suited than legislatures, however, to undertake
the political, identity-defining reconciliation of the competing
considerations. It is fine for courts to attempt an initial harmonizing of competing considerations, but only if the politically
accountable branches responsible for making political decisions
have the power to legislatively correct judicial efforts.234
If the statutory rule satisfies the first test, the court should
then ask whether the rule is reasonable, taking into account
the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s twin goals of creating a union and meaningfully empowering states. While such a “reasonableness” inquiry is intrinsically open ended, some concrete
guidelines do suggest themselves. To begin, a statutory provision that more-or-less embraces longstanding contemporary
Supreme Court doctrine would seem to automatically qualify as
reasonable. Similarly, a statutory provision adopting an approach that case law at one time reflected but later repudiated
would be reasonable unless the later cases rejected the approach because of manifest error or gross injustice. This is true
for two reasons. First, the mere fact that a majority of Supreme
Court Justices championed the approach for some time is
strong—though not dispositive—evidence that the approach is
reasonable.235 Second, judicial rejection of an approach sometimes reflects the conclusion that courts’ institutional characteristics rendered the approach judicially inadministrable, not
a determination that the approach was substantially wrongheaded.236
These guidelines are useful but nonexhaustive. After all,
there is no a priori reason why previous judicial approaches
234. Alternatively, Congress plausibly could delegate rule-making authority to an administrative agency to harmonize the Full Faith and Credit
Clause’s competing considerations across different contexts. This is a far inferior approach to the institutional arrangement sketched above in the text for
two reasons. First, an administrative agency likely would face the same problem as Congress: a limited ability to anticipate the varied contexts and carefully think through the relevant considerations without the detailed context
that adjudications provide. Second, administrative agencies lack Congress’s
authority and political accountability to make the political, identity-defining
decisions reconciling the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s competing considerations from context to context.
235. In my view, even a single Supreme Court Justice’s embrace of a particular approach in dissent would constitute significant evidence of reasonableness.
236. An example might be the Supreme Court’s approach to full faith and
credit taken in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159–60
(1932), which Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413–14 (1955), effectively rejects.
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 110, at 163.
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should limit the political branches’ legislative determinations
under the Effects Clause. Where there is no ready judicial analogue to the legislative determination, courts must directly
query whether the balance struck between the principles of
unification and meaningful empowerment is reasonable.
2. Application
This subsection considers DOMA’s applicability to a variety of acts and judgments.
a. Public Acts and Declaratory Judgments
Under the approach sketched above, DOMA’s choice-of-law
provisions would readily pass constitutional muster as applied
to the circumstances Congress drafted DOMA to address. With
regard to the first test, DOMA satisfies the clear statement rule
vis-à-vis the types of public acts and judgments that Congress
considered during the course of DOMA’s debate: public acts defining marriage and declaratory judgments that declare two
gays to be married. To apply the second test, one must distinguish between public acts and judgments. For public acts, the
DOMA rule tracks the ordinary full faith and credit doctrine
and for that reason readily qualifies as “reasonable.” The
analysis is only slightly more complex with respect to nonresidents who marry in a state that legalizes same-sex marriage
and then obtain a declaratory judgment reflecting their marital
status. Although full faith and credit law typically mandates
the enforcement of sister-state judgments, DOMA’s nonenforcement rule is similar to the exceptional cases that do not
require enforcement of judgments on the theory that demanding enforcement would constitute illicit extraterritorial regulation by the state that issued the judgment.237 It readily follows
that DOMA’s nonenforcement rule is reasonable as applied to
declaratory judgments same-sex couples obtain for the purpose
of circumventing home-state laws that do not authorize samesex marriage.238
b. Insurance Judgments
Next, consider DOMA’s application to a difficult hypothetical that Professor Koppelman formulates.239 Imagine a lawsuit
237. See supra Part II.C.
238. See supra Part II.C.1.
239. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 12–13.
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in Massachusetts by the same-sex spouse of a worker whose insurance policy covers “spouses.” If the insurance company declines coverage, a Massachusetts court might well decide that
the couple indeed is married and that the company must pay.
Armed with such a judgment, the prevailing plaintiff might
seek to enforce it in another jurisdiction where the insurance
company has assets. Because the judgment made an insurance
company liable to pay “spousal” benefits due to the injury of a
same-sex marriage partner, the insurance company might invoke DOMA to argue that state B need not enforce the judgment insofar as it is the product of a “claim arising from” a
same-sex relationship under DOMA language if state B does
not recognize same-sex marriages.240
Under my analysis, the insurance company cannot successfully invoke DOMA for two independent reasons. First, DOMA
does not apply because Congress did not contemplate such an
application during the course of DOMA’s debate and enactment.241 Second, applying DOMA would not reflect a “reasonable” harmonization of the principles of unification and state
sovereignty. The forum’s interest in not enforcing the judgment
is negligible. The domestic costs of enforcement are slight because courts, by virtue of their institutional role, enforce judgments (and even apply laws) from other sovereigns all the
time.242 Citizens consequently appear not to construe judicial
enforcement as governmental endorsement of the legal right in
question.243 Nor can one plausibly claim that nonenforcement
would advance the forum’s interest in paternalistically regulating the same-sex couple, for the forum does not have a legitimate interest in regulating nonresidents who simply seek enforcement of a judgment.244 Likewise, even if the insurance
company resides in the forum state, the forum has no legiti240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
241. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 17 (reviewing DOMA’s legislative
history and concluding that “[i]n writing the provision to cover judgments as
well as choice-of-law decisions, Congress does not seem to have contemplated
any genuinely adversarial proceeding” and that “the drafters of DOMA appear
to have been blind to the statute’s effects on the targeted class” in the type of
issues discussed in my example).
242. See Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 848 & n.283 (2004).
243. Id.
244. Moreover, it is hard to imagine in what way nonenforcement could
qualify as paternalistic regulation even if the forum did have some regulatory
interest. Can one seriously think that nonenforcement will lead couples to revisit their preferences regarding their partner’s gender?
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mate interest in ensuring that its corporate citizen avoid claims
connected to same-sex marriages that are legal in states where
the insurance company has voluntarily agreed to do business
and entered into contracts providing spousal benefits. By contrast, the costs to unification of refusing to recognize such a
judgment are substantial. There is strong national interest in
not creating a regime under which persons can dodge their
judgment obligations simply by refusing to pay and crossing a
state border.245 These various considerations justify interpreting DOMA more narrowly than its plain language admittedly
suggests.
If courts were to adopt my conclusion that application of
DOMA to the insurance company was not reasonable but reject
the rule of statutory interpretation that constitutes the first
step of my recommended analysis, it would not follow that
DOMA is unconstitutional. This is so for two reasons. First, the
Court could construe DOMA’s judgments provision narrowly to
apply only to declaratory judgments in accordance with the
canon of statutory interpretation that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress.”246 This narrowing interpretation of
DOMA does not run afoul of Congress’s intent for the reason
mentioned above: Congress did not consider DOMA’s application to garden-variety judgments but instead focused on ensuring that the nonadversarial declaratory judgments advised by
gay rights advocates not be thought to bind other states.247 Second, the Court could invoke the doctrine of severability and
conclude that although DOMA’s application to adversarial
judgments of the sort discussed above is unconstitutional,
“other applications of the statute may be separated from the
invalid applications and left in force.”248
245. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 883–91; Singer, supra note 7, at 20–22.
246. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
247. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 17.
248. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1951
(1997). Vermeule helpfully notes that “[t]here is a common misconception that
severability analysis refers only to the severance of provisions or subsections
enumerated or labeled independently in the official text of the statute” and
shows that severability analysis applies as well “to applications of a particular
statutory provision when some (but not all) of those applications are unconstitutional.” Id. at 1950 n.26.
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c. Same-Sex Marriage Dissolutions
Court orders in connection to the dissolution of a same-sex
marriage, such as orders for spousal support, child support, or
child visitation, present a far more difficult case. DOMA, under
my analysis, does not address such court orders because Congress did not consider these orders when it debated and enacted DOMA. If courts did not adopt this step of my analysis, or
if Congress were to enact a follow-up to DOMA that explicitly
applied to such orders (let us call this hypothetical enactment
“DOMA-2”), we would have to directly confront whether a rule
permitting states to refuse recognition of judgments in connection with the dissolution of a same-sex marriage is “reasonable.”
This is a very difficult question. In favor of enforcement,
such judgments can arise—and such judgments invariably will
arise now that same-sex marriage is legal in one state—in noncollusive contexts. Moreover, the knowledge that state B will
refuse to enforce postdivorce judgments in connection with
same-sex marriages might seriously hamper a same-sex divorcee’s willingness to relocate to state B, and such obstacles to relocation in turn may undermine one of the core benefits of the
national union.249 Another trouble is that obligors from dissolved same-sex marriages may relocate to those states that do
not enforce postdivorce judgments so as to effectively free
themselves of their obligations, thereby harming the obligees
who remain in the state in which the same-sex marriage occurred.250
On the other hand, requiring enforcement of such postdissolution judgments undeniably would constitute significant interference with the forum state’s ability to regulate its citizens
as it sees fit. It is important to remember that postdissolution
judgments typically are not one-shot requirements to pay
money or act in a certain manner, but instead regulate relations among the former spouses for a considerable time (for example, until minor children reach the age of majority). Accord249. Indeed, one readily can imagine the argument that such an obstacle
itself constitutes a deprivation of the constitutional right to travel, though current legal interpretations of the doctrine do not support such a claim. See
Rosen, supra note 115, at 913–19 (offering a normative argument in support of
the contemporary approach).
250. This might be an infrequent occurrence, for even obligors might be reluctant to relocate to a state whose policies do not accommodate their sexual
preferences.
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ingly, postdissolution judgments frequently require considerable judicial and executive branch involvement; officials regularly modify orders, and police and other executive branch officials routinely intervene to address the high rates of
noncompliance. Such governmental activity by the forum state
is the functional equivalent of ongoing legal regulation. As
such, if a same-sex divorcee resettles in a state that does not
recognize same-sex marriage, requiring the new state to enforce the former state’s judgment is tantamount to requiring
the new home state to regulate its (new) citizen under another
state’s law for the postdissolution judgment’s duration. This
displaces the new home state’s ability to regulate its citizens in
accordance with its public values; states design laws to encourage some behaviors and discourage others, signal values to citizens, and socialize citizens, and requiring the new home state
to enforce the former home state’s postdissolution judgment
over an extended period of time undermines these ends.251 The
former home state would in effect commandeer the new home
state’s public policy and undermine the new home state’s ability to advance its social agenda. Indeed, these very real interests of the new home state are the reason that heterosexual
postdivorce decrees are “nonfinal,” allowing the courts of the
new home state to modify them in accordance with the law of
the new home state.252
In short, the effect that is to be given to judgments in connection with the dissolution of same-sex marriages presents
profoundly difficult policy questions that go to the heart of the
character of our country’s federal union. Does the “unification”
principle behind full faith and credit mean that states cannot
burden a person’s ability to readily relocate by disregarding the
legal rights that the person’s former home state created? Or
does the “meaningful empowerment” principle behind full faith
and credit mean that the new home state cannot be effectively
forced to regulate its new citizen under the regulatory regime of
the citizen’s former state?
The answer cannot be arrived at through logic alone but
instead reflects a political decision that will shape the identity
251. Durability distinguishes postdissolution judgments from ordinary
judgments that enforce another polity’s law. The long-term character of postdissolution judgments transforms their enforcement into de facto displacement
of the forum law.
252. See Worthley v. Worthley, 283 P.2d 19, 21 (Cal. 1955); SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 110, at 676.
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of our federal union. For that reason, the political branches of
government bear the primary responsibility for answering the
question. If Congress forthrightly considered the matter and intentionally made a decision in a hypothetical DOMA-2 that
states need not enforce postdissolution judgments, it would be
hard to conclude that its decision, while difficult, was unreasonable. Thus, a clear congressional decision in DOMA-2 authorizing states to refuse to enforce judgments relating to the
dissolution of same-sex marriages would not be unconstitutional. As a practical matter, however, states that permit samesex marriage can significantly reduce the real-world costs of
DOMA-2. Part IV discusses in detail how states can largely
guaranty the enforcement of postdissolution judicial orders, effectively transforming DOMA-2 into a penalty-default rule.253
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE
“PLACE OF CELEBRATION” RULE
A. PROFESSOR SINGER’S ARGUMENT
In a recent article, Professor Joseph Singer argued that
DOMA is unconstitutional because full faith and credit requires
that there be “a single answer to the question of whether a couple is or is not married” and that the answer must be supplied
by the place of celebration.254 Even where a same-sex couple
living in a jurisdiction that does not recognize same-sex marriage (say Rhode Island) gets married in a state that grants
same-sex marriage (say Massachusetts), Singer concludes that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that all other states
treat the couple as married.255 Singer’s conclusion is predicated
253. For a general discussion of penalty default rules, see Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 105–06 (1989).
254. See Singer, supra note 7, at 45–46.
255. Singer decides on the basis of traditional conflict of laws principles
that the same-sex couple’s home jurisdiction (Rhode Island in the example in
the text above) should treat the couple as being married in Rhode Island because they are legally married in Massachusetts. Id. at 30. He then provides
several policy arguments supporting the proposition that marriage is a type of
law that is “entitled to recognition by other states even if this allows . . . one
state to export its law to the whole country.” Id. at 35. Singer’s constitutional
argument does not explicitly address out-of-state same-sex couples traveling to
Massachusetts simply to get married, but the policy needs he identifies are
equally applicable to these couples as to couples who reside in Massachusetts.
Indeed, when Professor Singer reviewed this manuscript and provided many
helpful criticisms, he did not dispute the position attributed to him above.
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on the assertion that there is a “need in an interstate system to
have a single answer to the question of whether one is or is not
married.”256 Otherwise, Singer argues, there will be a “problem
of inconsistent legal obligations” in such matters as protecting
offspring, allocating property interests, and sorting out other
marital responsibilities.257 Such differences of legal obligations
would permit a same-sex spouse to “evade [her] legal obligations under Massachusetts law” by relocating to a jurisdiction
that refused to recognize judgments relating to same-sex marriage.258 Let us call this the “obligation-evasion” problem.
The issues Singer identifies are real, but the solution he offers is deeply problematic for three reasons: first, Singer’s proposal is contrary to the rule that has been in place for the entirety of constitutional jurisprudence; second, there is precious
little doctrinal basis for his novel solution; and finally, far less
drastic means that are more protective of state interests can
address the legitimate concerns that Singer raises.
B. THREE CRITIQUES
1. Contrary to Constitutional Jurisprudence
To begin, Singer’s solution—creating a new constitutional
rule requiring states to recognize the marriages that are valid
in the place where the marriage was celebrated—is contrary to
the constitutional rule that has been in place for our nation’s
history. Courts and commentators at all times have understood
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not obligate state B
to recognize a marriage lawfully performed in state A.259 This is
so despite the widely divergent marriage rules found in different states at various times in our nation’s history. For instance,
until the 1960s, some states prohibited interracial marriages,
and when courts in such states were confronted with interracial
marriages that had been performed in states where such marriages were legal, the forum engaged in a nonconstitutional
choice-of-law analysis to determine whether the interracial
marriage should be recognized.260 The risks associated with
256. Id. at 36.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 6.
259. See Currie, supra note 61, at 10–11; Koppelman, supra note 4, at 10.
260. For a fascinating study examining how forum states with antimiscegenation treated interracial marriages performed in states not barring miscegenation, see Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and
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creating “inconsistent legal obligations” for marriage were present,261 yet the nation survived without the constitutional rule
Singer propounds. To be clear, Singer acknowledges that his
argument is difficult to “support based on historical interpretations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”262 Important to any
effort to assess the proposal’s desirability, however, is a full appreciation of how drastically his proposal breaks with past
practice.
2. Analogizing Singer’s Approach to Williams v.
North Carolina
Second, there is little doctrinal basis for Singer’s radical
proposal. The Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require that a single state’s law apply to
a particular transaction or occurrence (nor, a fortiori, does it
provide any criteria for determining which state’s law appropriately applies).263 Rather, with respect to laws, the Court has
folded full faith and credit into the due process doctrine that
serves as a threshold test to insure that a state seeking to regulate has the constitutionally required minimum contact necessary to legitimate its action.264 More specifically, the test is
Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998). There of course would have been no
state case law for Professor Koppelman to study if the place of celebration rule
had been a constitutional requirement. Antimiscegenation laws were not ruled
unconstitutional in America until 1967. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2
(1967) (holding that Virginia’s law prohibiting interracial marriages violated
the Fourteenth Amendment).
261. Singer, supra note 7, at 36.
262. Id. at 34.
263. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307, 308 n.10 (1981). This
has not always been the case. For some time the Court understood full faith
and credit as a doctrine determining which state’s law appropriately applied.
See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 115, at 960–62 & n.447 (discussing Bradford Elec.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1932) (Stone, J., concurring)); see also
id. at 947 & n.392. More recent cases have narrowed Clapper to its facts. See
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421–22 (1979); Rosen, supra note 115, at 961 &
n.447 (reviewing the Nevada decision). I have championed a revival of Clapper’s approach, suggesting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause appropriately
invites judicial scrutiny of whether state A’s interests pale in comparison to
those of state B ’s such that state B ’s law must be applied. Rosen, supra note
115, at 960. This method admittedly requires a “reworking of contemporary
full faith and credit doctrine.” Id. It would not lead, however, to Singer’s proposed solution that “place of celebration” alone determines which state’s law
applies. Cf. id. at 934–41 (explaining why using a single factor to determine
which law applies unduly imperils state interests and is unfair vis-à-vis parties).
264. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307–08.
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whether the state that seeks to apply its law to a given transaction or occurrence has a “significant contact . . . creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.”265 Notably, the full faith and credit inquiry does not compare which of several states has the greater
interest in regulating but only proscribes regulation from states
lacking the minimum contact.266 Accordingly, the full faith and
credit question under contemporary doctrine is whether domicile is a “significant contact” that creates interests on the part
of a state (let us say Rhode Island) such that application of its
marriage laws is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.
The answer unquestionably is yes, for domicile long has been
held to be a contact that justifies a state’s regulatory jurisdiction.267
Singer’s doctrinal argument primarily relies on the 1942
case of Williams v. North Carolina.268 The Williams Court held
that North Carolina was obligated to recognize a divorce issued
by Nevada despite the fact that North Carolina had been the
marital domicile, that the abandoned spouse still resided in
North Carolina, that only one of the spouses had been present
in Nevada (and the other spouse, in fact, had never been in Nevada), and that Nevada law permitted divorce under circumstances that North Carolina (at the time) did not.269 As a purely
doctrinal matter, Williams has never been understood to create
Singer’s rule that all states are constitutionally required to recognize marriages valid in the place of celebration.270 Divorce
decrees, unlike marriages, are court judgments, and the full
faith and credit doctrine long has distinguished between judgments and other “acts” of states.271

265. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313).
266. See generally Rosen, supra note 115, at 960–61 (explaining that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause limits the home state and host states alike).
267. See id.
268. 317 U.S. 287 (1942), vacated, 24 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. 1943).
269. See id. at 289–90, 303–04.
270. Indeed, the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not mandate recognizing marriages performed in another jurisdiction was the predicate for one of Professor Koppelman’s constitutional challenges to DOMA,
namely, that DOMA accomplished nothing and hence is irrational insofar as
states were constitutionally permitted to decline recognition of other states’
marriages even before it was enacted. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 10.
271. See supra Part II.
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Singer’s proposal thus amounts to an argument for extending the Williams rule to marriages.272 This would be unfortunate. Williams has been trenchantly critiqued since it was decided,273 and for good reason. The Williams rule problematically
diluted state sovereignty by giving states with the most lenient
divorce laws the constitutional power to export their rules to
more restrictive jurisdictions. Indeed, in the wake of the Williams ruling, “Nevada solidified its position as the nation’s
leading capital of migratory divorce, shortening its residence
requirements and expanding its grounds for divorce.”274 The
Williams decision hence undermined the extent to which other
states could efficaciously maintain stricter divorce laws that reflected their political community’s policy preferences, undercutting federalism’s promise of permitting divergent policies and
experimentation with substantive policies that are not themselves unconstitutional.275 Williams is unlikely to be overruled
on account of its age, but its pernicious effects on state sovereignty and policy diversity constitute solid reasons to resist its
extension. Furthermore, there is no policy basis for extending
Williams because, as I’ll soon discuss, there are far less drastic
mechanisms for solving the problems that motivate Singer’s solution.
Singer also relies on the dormant Commerce Clause’s “internal affairs” doctrine to support his claim that states should
be constitutionally required to recognize same-sex marriages
celebrated in jurisdictions permitting them.276 The internal affairs doctrine is a federal choice-of-law rule tied to the dormant
Commerce Clause; it makes law of the place of incorporation
the operative rule on such matters as shareholder voting rights
and the legal relations between shareholders and managers.277
This dormant Commerce Clause rule, however, has no application to family law. According to the Supreme Court, the internal affairs doctrine is applicable to “subjects that ‘are in their
272. See Singer, supra note 7, at 39–40 (“It would be odd if the Constitution
required the several states to recognize Nevada divorces but allowed states to
ignore Massachusetts marriages.”).
273. See, e.g., Williams, 317 U.S. at 304–07 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Currie, supra note 61, at 9.
274. Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the
Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2039 (2000).
275. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 882–91.
276. See Singer, supra note 7, at 41–42.
277. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987).
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nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation.’”278 The internal affairs doctrine sensibly selects one
state’s laws to govern shareholder voting rights because it
would be unworkable if multiple states’ divergent voting-rights
rules applied to a single corporation; each act of corporate governance otherwise could be subject to inconsistent and mutually inconsistent state law requirements. Similarly, it would
“threaten the free flow of interstate commerce”279 if each state
were able to set maximum limits on train lengths, which is why
the dormant Commerce Clause displaces these type of state
laws as well.
By contrast, the criteria for marriage do not belong to those
“subjects that ‘are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation.’”280 On the contrary, it is
in respect of such social policies about which citizens are deeply
divided that preserving the possibility of diverse state regimes
is most important.281 The mere fact that the marriage law selected by a state may have effects on interstate commerce does
not mean that the dormant Commerce Clause properly displaces the state law, for “‘there is a residuum of power in the
state to make laws governing matters of local concern which
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or
even, to some extent, regulate it.’”282
3. Alternative Approaches
Third, Singer exaggerates the novelty and dimensions of
obligation evasion and overlooks far less intrusive solutions
that can leave intact state prerogatives to differ substantively
on matters about which the Constitution does not demand national uniformity. Less intrusive solutions are preferable because the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not appropriately
used as a foil for diverse state policies not deemed unconstitutional.283
278. Id. at 88–89 (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
319 (1852)).
279. Rosen, supra note 115, at 929.
280. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88–89 (quoting Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319).
281. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 929; see also id. at 886–91 (explaining
the benefits of permitting different states to select different policies).
282. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (quoting
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 762 (1945)). For an excellent discussion of
this idea, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 806 (2001).
283. See generally Rosen, supra note 115, at 882–91 (arguing that extrater-
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Singer’s analysis overstates the problem because family
law has long been susceptible to attempts at “obligation evasion” and the complex child support and property problems
they create. In the context of heterosexual marriages, individuals (typically men) have married and had children in state B
despite an existing marriage in state A.284 Sometimes the second family is not discovered until after the man’s death, and
the law must determine how the bigamous husband’s estate
will be distributed. And in some cases, the man does not enter
into a second marriage but carries on an adulterous relationship that results in children. The law has devised solutions regarding child support and inheritance in such situations. These
circumstances are not very different from the scenario Singer
identifies of a gay spouse who tries to “skip out on [her] obligations” by abandoning her same-sex family and relocating to a
jurisdiction that does not recognize same-sex marriages.285 The
law’s solutions to these problems in the context of heterosexual
marriage suggest that there are solutions in the same-sex marriage context as well.
The major difference between abandonment in the heterosexual and homosexual marital contexts is that all states prohibit successive heterosexual marriages (absent divorce, annulment, or death), whereas states that do not recognize a
same-sex marriage may not view a successive heterosexual
marriage as bigamous.286 Singer’s proposed solution would
eliminate this difference by constitutionally requiring all states
to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in a jurisdiction
allowing such marriages. But Singer’s approach does not permit different states to have different policies on a matter in
which the Constitution and other federal law do not (as of yet,
at least) require national uniformity: same-sex marriage.

ritorial regulation of citizens to curb “travel-evasion” of state policy is fair).
284. For a recent example, see State v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1344, 1345
(Kan. 1986).
285. Singer, supra note 7, at 43.
286. States that do not recognize same-sex marriage could nonetheless
treat as bigamous a heterosexual marriage that followed a same-sex marriage
that had not been properly wound down, just as many states that prohibited
interracial marriages elected to recognize such marriages that were performed
in jurisdictions that permitted them. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Same
Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 952–62
(1998) (describing case law in which forums that prohibited interracial marriage nonetheless recognized interracial marriages performed outside the jurisdiction).
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Fortunately, there is another way to address obligation
evasion without sacrificing state sovereignty and jeopardizing
federalism’s benefits with regard to diversity across states
among policies that are neither constitutionally required nor
proscribed. Instead of demanding that all states treat same-sex
marriages as valid marriages, the state that validates same-sex
marriages unilaterally can ensure that a spouse who relocates
to a jurisdiction that does not recognize same-sex marriage
does not evade maritally created obligations. For example,
states permitting same-sex marriages can criminalize the
abandonment of spouses, the cessation of child support payments, and the like. Should abandonment or other criminal offenses occur, the state accepting same-sex marriage can demand extradition of the offending party. That state can then
subject the evader to its laws and judicial procedures.
This “extradition” solution works well both doctrinally and
normatively. Doctrinally, it is well established that the asylum
state (i.e., the state that does not recognize same-sex marriage)
has no discretion to deny a valid extradition request issued by a
sister state; there is no “public policy exception” with regard to
extradition,287 nor must the alleged offense be criminal in the
asylum state.288 This means that Massachusetts could validly
prosecute the same-sex spouse who had fled Massachusetts,
even if she is domiciled in a jurisdiction that does not recognize
same-sex marriages. States have the power to criminally prosecute noncitizens’ out-of-state activities if those “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction [are] intended to produce and produc[e] detrimental effects within it.”289 Individuals can be extradited for
misdemeanors and for the failure to support minor children.290
Moreover, it is well established that even if the act that completes the crime (such as celebration of the second marriage

287. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (“We reaffirm
the conclusion that the commands of the Extradition Clause are mandatory,
and afford no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum
State.”).
288. Id. at 225 (upholding Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (22 How.) 66
(1860), which “rejected the position . . . that the Extradition Clause required
only the delivery of fugitives charged with acts which would be criminal by the
law of the asylum State”).
289. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), discussed in Rosen,
supra note 115, at 864–71 (showing that Strassheim’s rule has been incorporated into the Model Penal Code).
290. See Leslie W. Abramson, Extradition in America: Of Uniform Acts and
Governmental Discretion, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 793, 822 (1981).
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without having terminated the prior same-sex marriage) occurred outside of the demanding state, the demanding state
may still validly request extradition so long as some of the acts
in relation to the crime occurred there.291 Plans to abandon
one’s same-sex spouse—and perhaps even the same-sex marriage itself—should satisfy this requirement.292
To anticipate a likely objection, it does not matter that the
activity completing the criminality occurred in a jurisdiction
that does not criminalize the conduct. The Model Penal Code
provides that a state can exercise legislative jurisdiction if the
“actor purposely or knowingly caused the result within the
State” even though “causing a particular result is an element of
an offense and the result is caused by conduct occurring outside
the State that would not constitute an offense if the result had
occurred there.”293 Under this provision, Massachusetts can
criminalize as bigamous a heterosexual marriage occurring in
Rhode Island where one of the parties to the marriage previously entered into a same-sex marriage in Massachusetts that
was not lawfully terminated prior to the Rhode Island marriage. The Model Code provision means that Massachusetts can
criminalize the conduct even if Rhode Island would not treat
the Rhode Island marriage as bigamous because it does not
291. See Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285 (“[T]he criminal need not do within
the State every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there an overt
act which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the
crime, and then absents himself from the State and does the rest elsewhere,
he becomes a fugitive from justice, when the crime is complete, if not before.
For all that is necessary to convert a criminal under the laws of a State into a
fugitive from justice is that he should have left the State after having incurred
guilt there, and his overt act becomes retrospectively guilty when the contemplated result ensues.” (citations omitted)).
292. Moreover, there may be no requirement that the defendant have undertaken any acts in furtherance of her crime while she was in the demanding
state or indeed that she ever have been in the demanding state. State regulatory jurisdiction extends to persons who undertake acts outside the state that
are intended to have pernicious consequences in the state. See Rosen, supra
note 115, at 880–81. If there is no such requirement, the mere fact that the
person is outside of the jurisdiction she has harmed should qualify her as a
“fugitive” for purposes of the federal statute that implements the Extradition
Clause. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2000) (requiring extradition of a “fugitive from
justice”). Asylum states may statutorily adopt rules that permit extradition
more readily than does federal law, and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
permits the extradition of persons who commit criminal acts in states where
they were never physically present. See Abramson, supra note 290, at 828–29
(noting this but suggesting that the Constitution does “not appear to” require
extradition under such circumstances).
293. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(3) (1985).
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recognize Massachusetts’s same-sex marriage as a valid marriage.
But would the extradition solution be available under
DOMA? One might think that DOMA would free the executive
in the asylum state from offering up a person whose crime relates to obligations in connection to her same-sex marriage in
another state. In fact, the executive’s obligation pursuant to the
Extradition Clause would trump DOMA. The Supreme Court
has construed the Extradition Clause’s charge that fugitives
“shall . . . be delivered up” as creating a categorical duty on the
part of the chief executive of the asylum state.294 In contrast to
the Effects Clause, there is no language in the Extradition
Clause granting Congress authority to provide an alternative to
what the Supreme Court has said the Extradition Clause requires.
Even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied to executive orders under the Extradition Clause, empowering Congress pursuant to the Effects Clause to determine the effect of
such orders, Congress’s Effects Clause powers would not extend
to eliminating the Extradition Clause’s categorical requirement
that the asylum state comply with the demanding state’s extradition request. Congress lacks the power under the Effects
Clause because deciding that executive orders need not be
categorically respected would not be “reasonable”; there are
significant benefits to the federal Union and virtually no costs
to a categorical requirement giving effect to extradition orders.
Conversely, there are significant costs and almost no benefits to
a noncategorical rule. The benefit of the categorical extradition
requirement is that it “preclude[s] any state from becoming a
sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state.”295 This
smoothes relations among states and helps states enforce their
laws.
These benefits come at virtually no cost to the asylum state
because, as the Supreme Court has noted, the extradition obligation is merely ministerial in nature.296 The asylum state is
not permitted to pass judgment on the wisdom of the demanding state’s decision to criminalize a particular behavior but instead must hand over fugitives solely for the purpose of
strengthening the federal Union. Thus, the delivery of fugitives
294. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 224 n.3 (1987) (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2).
295. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978).
296. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 226.
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cannot plausibly constitute the asylum state’s endorsement of
the policy choices behind the demanding state’s criminal law.
Further, the asylum state need do absolutely nothing beyond
delivering the fugitive; prosecution, imprisonment, and so forth
all are undertaken solely by the demanding state. As such, the
asylum state’s compliance with the demanding state’s order
does not compromise the asylum state’s ability to advance its
public policies. This means that the asylum state has no valid
interest in resisting the extradition order; the asylum state has
no legitimate interest in interfering with other states’ lawful
regulation of persons, even of the asylum state’s own citizens, if
such persons act so as to trigger the demanding state’s regulatory jurisdiction.297 A noncategorical extradition obligation, by
contrast, would interfere with the demanding state’s policies. A
categorical extradition requirement thus brings benefits to both
the asylum and demanding states, whereas a noncategorical
requirement harms the demanding state without bringing corresponding benefits to the asylum state.
Solving the evasion obligation problems Singer identifies
by means of the Extradition Clause is normatively attractive
for several reasons. First, the Extradition Clause has long been
understood as the doctrinal vehicle designed to deal with the
evasionary problem of persons seeking to escape obligations by
crossing a state’s border. As the Court recently put it, the Extradition Clause is designed to “preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state.”298
Second, the extradition solution permits the demanding state
(i.e., the state that recognizes same-sex marriage) to defend its
interests in protecting its citizens without unduly interfering
with the asylum state’s policy preferences. There is a meaningful difference between requiring the asylum state to deliver a
fugitive to the demanding state and making same-sex marriages valid nationwide. For the reasons discussed above, the
asylum state’s delivery of fugitives does not constitute the asylum state’s endorsement of the policy choices behind the demanding state’s criminal law. By contrast, Singer’s solution
radically interferes with the asylum state’s ability to advance
its vision of the good, for it displaces the asylum state’s substantive law when it mandates that all states recognize samesex marriages as valid.
297. For a discussion of the circumstances under which a state has a legitimate interest in regulating a person, see Rosen, supra note 115, at 956–58.
298. Doran, 439 U.S. at 287.
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It is true that the extradition solution does not solve all potential problems of the sort Professor Singer identifies, but incompleteness is not a reason to support Professor Singer’s proposal. The extradition solution does not solve the problem of
obligation evasion if the state that accepts same-sex marriage
does not criminalize abandonment (or the other acts of obligation evasion) or if the state fails to conscientiously enforce those
laws with extradition demands. Merely identifying a problem,
however, does not mean that the appropriate solution comes
from the Constitution. And that is the case here—a state’s failure to ensure the efficacy of its laws is a state political problem
that is appropriately remedied by the state, not by federal constitutional law.299
The extradition solution also does not solve the problem of
obligation evasion if the state accepting same-sex marriage is
unable to locate the fleeing spouse who elects to remarry elsewhere without informing authorities in her new state that she
was previously married. This is not a consideration that weighs
in favor of Professor Singer’s approach, however, because this
danger would persist if his solution were adopted. After all, obligation-evasion problems remain in the context of heterosexual
marriages that follow undissolved heterosexual marriages
when the bigamous party does not make her prior marriage
known to the second jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that
all states would recognize the first marriage and treat the second marriage as a bigamous union that hence is null and void.
In any event, the state recognizing same-sex unions can seek to
discourage such devious behavior by criminalizing it. For example, Massachusetts can criminalize the failure of a Massachusetts-married spouse to inform authorities and parties in
another jurisdiction of her prior same-sex marriage. Another
possibility would be for Massachusetts to require, upon pains of
criminal liability, all same-sex spouses to notify the state of a
pending marriage in another jurisdiction.
Differences between a prior same-sex and a prior heterosexual marriage admittedly may arise if the second marriage is
discovered: both states will declare the second marriage null
and void as bigamous in the latter context but not necessarily
in the former.300 This distinction, however, is less significant
299. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810
(2005).
300. I say “not necessarily” because it is possible that the second state
would give effect to a same-sex marriage celebrated in a jurisdiction that rec-
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than may at first appear. It likely would have little if any effect
on child-support obligations, which states increasingly determine without regard to whether the parents were married.301
Whether a child’s parents were married admittedly is relevant
to inheritance in many states, though even the significance of
this is diminishing, as “most if not all states” have enacted
statutes that “permit an illegitimate child to inherit at least
from its mother.”302
In the end, the major distinction between the two cases
(where the prior marriage is same-sex and where it was heterosexual) is that whereas both states will declare void the heterosexual marriage following a prior heterosexual marriage that
was not properly terminated, the second marriage may be
deemed valid in the state that does not accept same-sex marriages while the first marriage may be deemed valid (and the
second marriage invalid) in the state that accepts same-sex
marriage. In short, each state may recognize as valid a different marriage.
Though this may seem odd at first, it is an acceptable byproduct of our federal system’s commitment to supporting divergent state choices on matters in which the Constitution and
other federal law do not mandate national uniformity. As I
have demonstrated at length elsewhere, concurrent regulatory
authority among multiple polities is the ordinary state of affairs.303 As a result, a given transaction or occurrence is frequently regulated simultaneously by more than one polity.304
What is more, “regulatory authority is concurrent even when
the states’ regulations substantively conflict,”305 and this is
true for both civil and criminal regulation.306 The omnipresence
of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction is a consequence of many
transactions and occurrences having effects extending beyond
the borders of a single polity. Thus, multiple polities have legitimate interests. Federal law (both constitutional and statutory) typically does not select one of the polities as having reguognizes such marriages even though the second state itself does not permit
such marriage. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 260, at 952–62 (showing that states
that barred miscegenation nonetheless tended to recognize interracial marriages celebrated in jurisdictions that permitted such unions).
301. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Illegitimate Children § 90 (2005).
302. See id. § 120.
303. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 946–55.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 949.
306. See id. at 946–49 (civil); id. at 949–54 (criminal).
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latory jurisdiction but instead acknowledges that the states’
have overlapping regulatory authority and leaves it to the
states themselves—through the state law known as conflicts of
law—to determine which among many potentially applicable
state laws should apply in a given litigation.307 In fact, full faith
and credit cases often observe that
although the clause permitted the forum state to apply its law to the
controversy, the nonforum state would have been free to apply its law
to the self-same parties and occurrences had the lawsuit been filed
there; this of course presumes that both states had regulatory powers
over the parties and occurrence, and that the only question under full
faith and credit was which state’s laws were to be applied by the particular court that was hearing the matter.308

Viewed in this context, the prospect that two states may
disagree about what constitutes a valid marriage is not terribly
daunting. The disagreement reflects the fact that different political communities feel differently about what constitutes a
valid marriage, and federalism’s commitments to political diversity suggest that such differences should be embraced, not
undermined, until and unless it is properly decided that there
ought to be a uniform national rule. If it seems odd that two
persons may be married in the eyes of one state but not others,
that may stem from an inchoate sense that marriage ought to
be a matter of national uniformity. To date, however, American
law pointedly has not adopted this position.
To address another bogeyman, it frequently is argued that
allowing some states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriage
performed in Massachusetts would mean that the couple’s
status would change depending upon what state border they
happened to cross.309 This is not so. At all times, regardless of
their physical location, Massachusetts recognizes their marital
union and Rhode Island (let us say) does not. If an event occurs
in another state that triggers a lawsuit—for example, an automobile accident in Rhode Island results in a lawsuit that raises
the issue of potential recovery for loss of conjugal rights—the
injured same-sex spouse can sue the defendant in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court could decide under the choiceof-law doctrine of depecage that Rhode Island tort law applies
to the accident but that questions of family law for purposes of

307. See id. at 946–47 & n.391.
308. See id. at 946–47 (footnote omitted).
309. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 7, at 13–14.
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damages are to be governed by Massachusetts law.310 If Massachusetts does not have personal jurisdiction over the Rhode Island defendant, the injured same-sex spouse would have to sue
in Rhode Island and argue to the Rhode Island court that Massachusetts family should govern the question of whether she
was married and hence eligible for certain marriage-related
damages. Under this set of circumstances, Rhode Island’s refusal under DOMA to recognize same-sex marriages would
limit the same-sex spouse’s legal interests. These are real costs,
but they are the costs of federalism’s respect for the preferences
of different political communities.
Even if the states may disagree as to whether a particular
couple is married, each state may protect the parties it deems
to be married. The same-sex spouse who left, say, Massachusetts to take up a new life elsewhere is still subject to Massachusetts’s jurisdiction if she has left a spouse and/or dependent
there. The mere fact that she is no longer present in Massachusetts does not put her beyond Massachusetts’s regulatory powers. Her same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, along with any
spouse or dependents she left behind, give Massachusetts
courts “continuing jurisdiction” and undoubtedly qualify as
“significant contact[s]” that “creat[e] state interests, such that
choice of [Massachusetts] law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”311 Massachusetts accordingly can prosecute
her for bigamy, abandonment, and so forth because she has violated Massachusetts’s public policies, even if her new state of
residence would not recognize the “second” marriage as bigamous. Similarly, a Massachusetts court would have continuing
jurisdiction over her if her abandoned same-sex spouse were to
sue in Massachusetts for divorce or other marriage-related reasons.
Complications would arise if the abandoning same-sex
spouse were involved in a lawsuit in her new home state that
could deplete the assets that would be available to support her
abandoned Massachusetts family. Though most lawsuits would
not pose problems unique to the same-sex marriage context—
the danger always exists for both heterosexual and same-sex
families that a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction could lead to an
impoverishing damages award—complications unique to same310. See generally RUSSELL J.
FLICT OF LAWS § 3.4, at 94–101 (4th

WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONed. 2001) (explaining depecage).
311. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)).
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sex marriages occur with the legal dissolution of a subsequent
heterosexual marriage. If the dissolution occurs outside of a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage, the question
arises as to whether that jurisdiction will consider the financial
obligation that the divorcing spouse already owes to her samesex family when the court calculates how property should be
distributed, ongoing support obligations, and so forth. If the
court does not take account of those obligations tied to the divorcing spouse’s abandoned same-sex family, then inadequate
funds may remain when a lawsuit for divorce and support for
the same-sex family goes forward in Massachusetts. Massachusetts and individuals can alleviate this problem. Massachusetts
can impose disclosure requirements that the commonwealth
and the same-sex spouse be apprised of a pending lawsuit to
dissolve a subsequent heterosexual marriage and criminalize
the failure to disclose. The parties entering into a same-sex union in Massachusetts can contractually include a sue-first requirement in Massachusetts, which other jurisdictions typically
respect.
While I cannot hope in the course of this Article to anticipate all possible outcomes that may arise as a result of states’
disagreement on what qualifies as a legitimate marriage, I do
hope that I’ve shown that many of the problems can be obviated, or at the very least ameliorated, by states that recognize
same-sex marriage. The problems that remain constitute the
unavoidable costs of federalism’s commitment to diverse state
policies on matters about which people strongly disagree but
with respect to which neither the Constitution nor other federal
law requires a uniform national rule.
CONCLUSION
The Lawrence decision did not render DOMA unconstitutional. Lawrence equipped gay-rights activists with some favorable new constitutional principles, but it also embraced concepts that opponents of same-sex marriage can apply toward
their cause. The Lawrence Court participated in the ongoing
national dialogue concerning gay rights, yet deliberately left
undecided the constitutional status of same-sex marriage. This
is a good thing, for allowing a wide-ranging societal debate on
gay-rights issues to continue has many benefits, and there are
numerous dangers to the Court prematurely ruling on issues
about which citizens are deeply divided and with respect to
which societal norms are in a state of considerable flux. Time
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will tell whether Lawrence’s new principles will develop into
doctrines that provide strong constitutional protections to gays
and (perhaps) other disfavored groups, or whether these new
principles ultimately will be limited to their facts. What is clear
is that Lawrence did not render DOMA unconstitutional—at
least not yet.
Nor was DOMA unconstitutional before Lawrence was decided. This Article has rebutted the many arguments that have
been made by numerous scholars—including Dean Larry
Kramer and Professors Laurence Tribe, Andy Koppelman,
Stanley Cox, and Emily Sack—that DOMA exceeded Congress’s
powers under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Several critiques of DOMA recur in the scholarly literature. Claims that
DOMA violates state sovereignty by interfering with a family
law subject that appropriately falls to the domain of the states
are premised on a mischaracterization of DOMA: it does not
regulate family law but serves the quintessentially federal
function of determining the extraterritorial effect of state law.
Arguments that DOMA undermines full faith and credit’s fundamental principle of unifying the country overlook the second
animating principle behind full faith and credit—maintaining
meaningfully empowering states—with which DOMA is fully
consistent. Scholarly critiques of DOMA have assumed that it
authorizes states to deviate from Supreme Court precedent regarding the enforcement of judgments, but this Article has
demonstrated that DOMA actually fills a gap in Supreme Court
jurisprudence in a manner fully consistent with precedent.
Even were this not so, DOMA would not be unconstitutional,
because Congress has authority to legislate full faith and credit
rules that vary from the Supreme Court’s. This analysis answers several other scholarly critiques that boil down to the
unargued assertion that the Supreme Court has the final say in
determining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires.
Finally, the Article has engaged Professor Singer’s novel
argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that
marriages sanctioned by one state be recognized by all. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be used to thwart differences across constitutional, substantive state policies. The
problems that Singer’s proposal attempts to counter can be addressed by alternative methods that do not intrude as radically
in state sovereignty. Where the Constitution does not (yet, at
least) demand a uniform national rule, diverse state policies
should not be hindered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
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In the end, DOMA is best understood as an example of
congressional participation in the process of defining our country’s constitutional culture. The Court has not yet decided the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage, and DOMA reflects the
political branches’ contribution to the process of deciding how
America should deal with the incidents of gay life. DOMA’s actual effects on constitutional culture remain to be seen: will it
shape societal views, prompt angry opposition, or something
else? Until the Supreme Court takes a definitive position, and
perhaps even after, other societal actors are entitled to react to
Congress’s views on same-sex marriage and thereby participate
in the ongoing development of American constitutional culture.

